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A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES
Lina M. Khan∗ & David E. Pozen∗∗
The concept of “information fiduciaries” has surged to the forefront of debates on onlineplatform regulation. Developed by Professor Jack Balkin, the concept is meant to rebalance
the relationship between ordinary individuals and the digital companies that accumulate,
analyze, and sell their personal data for profit. Just as the law imposes special duties of care,
confidentiality, and loyalty on doctors, lawyers, and accountants vis-à-vis their patients and
clients, Balkin argues, so too should it impose special duties on corporations such as
Facebook, Google, and Twitter vis-à-vis their end users. Over the past several years, this
argument has garnered remarkably broad support and essentially zero critical pushback.
This Article seeks to disrupt the emerging consensus by identifying a number of lurking
tensions and ambiguities in the theory of information fiduciaries, as well as a number of
reasons to doubt the theory’s capacity to resolve them satisfactorily. Although we agree with
Balkin that the harms stemming from dominant online platforms call for legal intervention,
we question whether the concept of information fiduciaries is an adequate or apt response
to the problems of information insecurity that he stresses, much less to more fundamental
problems associated with outsized market share and business models built on pervasive
surveillance. We also call attention to the potential costs of adopting an informationfiduciary framework — a framework that, we fear, invites an enervating complacency toward
online platforms’ structural power and a premature abandonment of more robust visions of
public regulation.

INTRODUCTION
Digital businesses such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter collect an
enormous amount of data about their users. Sometimes they do things
with this data that threaten the users’ best interests, from allowing predatory advertising and enabling discrimination to inducing addiction and
sharing sensitive details with third parties. Online platforms may also
disserve their users and the general public in myriad other ways, including by facilitating the spread of disinformation and the harassment of
certain categories of speakers. The European Union has responded to
some of these concerns with a comprehensive personal data law, the
General Data Protection Regulation1 (GDPR). After years of relative
neglect, U.S. policymakers, roused by Russian interference in the 2016
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗
∗∗

Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School.
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, we thank
Alex Abdo, Jack Balkin, Danielle Citron, Evan Criddle, Kristen Eichensehr, Andrew Gold, James
Grimmelmann, Claudia Haupt, Thomas Kadri, Amy Kapczynski, Ramya Krishnan, Ronald
Krotoszynski, Genevieve Lakier, Kyle Langvardt, Ethan Leib, Barry Lynn, Tamara Piety, Robert
Post, Jed Purdy, Neil Richards, Marc Rotenberg, Chuck Sabel, Ganesh Sitaraman, Matt Stoller,
Tim Wu, and Jonathan Zittrain, as well as workshop participants at Cornell Tech, University of
Denver Sturm College of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, and Yale Law School.
1 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. The GDPR, which was adopted in 2016
and entered into force in May 2018, id. at 87, replaced a 1995 directive on data protection, Council
Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
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presidential election and the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal,
have begun to consider a range of reforms to enhance consumer privacy,
corporate transparency, and data security on the internet.2 To an unprecedented degree, technology firms in general and online platforms in
particular find themselves “in Congress’s sights.”3
Among the reforms under consideration is the idea of treating online
platforms as “information fiduciaries.” Professor Kenneth Laudon appears to have coined this phrase in the early 1990s.4 Since 2014, it has
been identified with Professor Jack Balkin, who has developed the idea
over a series of papers.5 Ordinary people, Balkin observes, are deeply
dependent on and vulnerable to the digital companies that accumulate,
analyze, and sell their personal data for profit. To mitigate this vulnerability and ensure these companies do not betray the trust people place

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2 See, e.g., MARK R. WARNER, POTENTIAL POLICY PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF
SOCIAL MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 5–23 (2018), https://graphics.axios.com/pdf/Platform
PolicyPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCL-TSHM] (surveying policy options).
3 HEATHER WHITNEY, EMERGING THREATS: SEARCH ENGINES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND
THE EDITORIAL ANALOGY 2 (David Pozen ed., 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/
documents/4959005632/Search-Engines--Social-Media--and-the-Editorial-Analogy.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2RT4-A9HE].
4 See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, ICIS 1993 PROC. 65, 70–71 (proposing a “National Information Market,” id. at 70, within which “information fiduciaries would naturally arise”
and “would accept deposits of information from depositors and seek to maximize the return on sales
of that information in national markets or elsewhere in return for a fee,” id. at 71).
5 Balkin first promoted the idea in a 2014 blog post. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries
in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5, 2014, 4:50 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/
03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html [https://perma.cc/L277-CZLG] [hereinafter Balkin,
Digital Age]. He most fully elaborated his views in Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information
Fiduciaries]. Additional discussions include Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech in the Algorithmic
Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1149, 1160–63 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Algorithmic Society]; Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech
Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2047–54 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Triangle]; Jack M.
Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/informationfiduciary/502346 [https://perma.cc/3PL4-3SQT]; and Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand
Bargain 11–15 (Hoover Working Grp. on Nat’l Sec., Tech. & Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814,
2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.
cc/774R-AD7D] [hereinafter Balkin, Fixing Social Media]. Professor Jonathan Zittrain has also
been an important theorist and advocate of the information-fiduciary concept. See, e.g., Balkin &
Zittrain, supra; Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding
Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciarysolution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/K2EE-8YJ5]; Jonathan Zittrain, How
to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://
hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for [https://perma.cc/W233-C7Q6] [hereinafter Zittrain, How to Exercise]; Jonathan Zittrain, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Can Still Fix This
Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2EsJ0La [https://perma.cc/LMA7-EVKE] [hereinafter Zittrain, Fix This Mess].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661

500

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:497

in them,6 Balkin urges that we draw on principles of fiduciary obligation. Just as the law imposes special duties of care, confidentiality, and
loyalty on doctors, lawyers, accountants, and estate managers vis-àvis their patients and clients, so too should it impose such duties on
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, and Uber vis-à-vis their end users — although Balkin concedes that the duties would be “more limited”
in the digital context.7
Support for this idea is swelling. Dozens of legal scholars have endorsed Balkin’s proposal or discussed it approvingly.8 Journalists have
covered it with undisguised enthusiasm; a recent Bloomberg subheadline
reads: “America needs data rules that won’t crush the tech industry.
One law professor may have figured out a solution.”9 Lawmakers from
both parties have expressed interest.10 Last December, a group of fifteen
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 In recent years, a number of privacy law scholars have highlighted ways in which privacy
and trust are intertwined online, if not co-constitutive. See, e.g., ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY
AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018); Neil Richards &
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016).
7 Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and
Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1229 (2017)
[hereinafter Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics]; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1226;
Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12.
8 On our reading, the academic literature taking up the idea of information fiduciaries has been
overwhelmingly supportive. For representative responses from leading scholars of internet law, see
Frank Pasquale, Lecture, Response: Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1244 (2017) (“I
believe that Balkin’s concept of information fiduciary is well developed and hard to challenge.”);
and Tim Wu, Opinion, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2018), https://nyti.ms/2LIrMy4 [https://perma.cc/8FHR-CMTG] (“[Technology] companies should
be considered, to borrow a term coined by the law professor Jack Balkin, ‘information fiduciaries’ . . . .”). The closest we have found to a skeptical note is Professor Jane Bambauer’s suggestion
that an “expansion of Balkin’s proposal” to cover additional classes of data collectors, such as
Netflix and Amazon, “could cause unsettling distortions of free speech protection.” Jane R.
Bambauer, Response, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1941, 1949 (2016) (emphasis added). As far as we are aware, this Article is the first to apply any
sustained critical scrutiny to the information-fiduciary concept.
9 Editorial, How to Make Facebook and Google Behave, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-24/make-facebook-and-google-informationfiduciaries [https://perma.cc/5SFX-FK25] [hereinafter Bloomberg Editorial]. On a single day this
past spring, Balkin’s proposal received glowing coverage in multiple popular pieces. See Russell
Brandom, This Plan Would Regulate Facebook Without Going Through Congress, THE VERGE (Apr.
12, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/12/17229258/facebook-regulation-fiduciaryrule-data-proposal-balkin [https://perma.cc/WHW7-G3AP]; Yves Faguy, Regulating Facebook to
Make It an Information Fiduciary, NAT’L MAG. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/
20180416050935/http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/April-2018/Regulating-Facebook-tomake-it-an-information-fidu.aspx [https://perma.cc/WS8N-XTBF]; Nathan Heller, We May Own
Our Data, but Facebook Has a Duty to Protect It, NEW YORKER (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.
newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/we-may-own-our-data-but-facebook-has-a-duty-toprotect-it [https://perma.cc/KN75-RSZ5].
10 See, e.g., 164 CONG. REC. S2026 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2018) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn)
(“Perhaps we should treat social media platforms as information fiduciaries and impose legal obligations on them, as we do with lawyers and doctors, who are privy to some of our most personal,
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Democratic senators took the next step and introduced legislation that
would require online service providers to act as fiduciaries for their users, drawing directly from Balkin’s proposal.11 Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg has now signaled his support as well.12 Balkin is the legal
academy’s preeminent diagnostician of how theories can move over time
from the margins to the mainstream, from “off-the-wall” to “on-thewall.”13 He is also an ingenious idea entrepreneur whose own theory of
information fiduciaries is rapidly making this very transition.
We admire Balkin’s ingenuity and applaud his efforts to advance the
cause of platform regulation. Yet while we largely agree with his analysis of why certain digital firms should be regulated more vigorously,
we question whether the concept of information fiduciaries is an adequate or apt response to the problems of information asymmetry and
abuse that he stresses, much less to more fundamental problems associated with market dominance and with business models that demand
pervasive surveillance. The primary aims of this Article are, first, to
identify a number of lurking ambiguities and tensions in the theory of
information fiduciaries and, second, to raise concerns about the theory’s
capacity to resolve them satisfactorily.14 The Article also calls attention
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
private information.”); WARNER, supra note 2, at 14–15 (listing Balkin’s idea first on a list of policy
options for Congress to consider in the area of “Privacy and Data Protection,” id. at 14); Heller,
supra note 9 (observing that, “[t]o a striking degree, the fiduciary model was the one toward which
discussion . . . converged” in an April 2018 Senate hearing on Facebook); see also Zittrain, How to
Exercise, supra note 5 (“We’ve found that our [information-fiduciary] proposal has bipartisan appeal in Congress . . . .”).
11 Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Press Release, Office of Senator
Brian Schatz, Schatz Leads Group of 15 Senators in Introducing New Bill to Help Protect People’s
Personal Data Online (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.schatz.senate.gov/press-releases/schatz-leadsgroup-of-15-senators-in-introducing-new-bill-to-help-protect-peoples-personal-data-online [https://
perma.cc/4PPN-WJL7] (describing the proposed legislation, referred to as the “Data Fiduciary Act”
by Senator Cory Booker, as “establishing a fiduciary duty for online providers”).
12 When Senator Brian Schatz, a lead sponsor of the Data Care Act, raised Balkin’s informationfiduciary idea at a high-profile hearing last year, “Zuckerberg seemed to perk up. ‘I think it’s
certainly an interesting idea,’ Zuckerberg said, ‘and Jack is very thoughtful in this space, so I do
think it deserves consideration.’” Brandom, supra note 9. At a more recent event with Zittrain,
Zuckerberg described the “idea of [Facebook] having a fiduciary relationship with the people who
use our services” as “intuitive” and consistent with Facebook’s “own self-image . . . and what we’re
doing.” At Harvard Law, Zittrain and Zuckerberg Discuss Encryption, “Information Fiduciaries”
and Targeted Advertisements, HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 20, 2019), https://today.law.harvard.edu/atharvard-law-zittrain-and-zuckerberg-discuss-encryption-information-fiduciaries-and-targetedadvertisements [https://perma.cc/5JNH-T8DQ] [hereinafter Zittrain and Zuckerberg].
13 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 12 (2011); see id. at 61, 69–70, 88, 119,
177–83; Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040
[https://perma.cc/Y4LD-8RR5].
14 Given that the firms Balkin would designate as information fiduciaries vary in the services
they provide, the business models they use, and the market dominance they enjoy, any analysis of
the designation’s appropriateness or helpfulness will necessarily vary to some extent by firm. For
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to the potential costs of adopting an information-fiduciary framework — a framework that, we fear, invites an enervating complacency
about issues of structural power and a premature abandonment of more
robust visions of public regulation.
I. FIDUCIARIES FOR WHOM?
Balkin offers his theory of information fiduciaries as a response to
problems of asymmetric vulnerability and dependency online. A key
feature of the digital economy, he observed in his original essay on the
subject, is that “[m]any of the online services that people use require
them to trust companies with sensitive personal information.”15 These
companies have “increasing capacities for surveillance and control” of
their users, but users have little ability to monitor the companies.16 Users therefore worry, with good reason, that the companies will take advantage of them. To help level the playing field and allay such worries,
Balkin proposes that we draw on principles of fiduciary law that assign
one actor (the fiduciary) “special obligations of loyalty and trustworthiness” toward another actor (the beneficiary).17 As Balkin emphasizes,
fiduciary relationships have been created in a variety of contexts, including where ordinary individuals surrender sensitive information to a
professional expert — such as a doctor, lawyer, or accountant — to obtain the benefit of the fiduciary’s valuable-yet-not-fully-comprehensible
skills and services.18
The principal goal of designating digital companies as fiduciaries for
their users, Balkin explains, is to prevent these companies from engaging
in “egregious . . . bad behavior.”19 No longer will they be able to “act
like con artists.”20 “The long-term goal is to create legal incentives” for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
purposes of this analysis, we focus above all on Facebook, both because Facebook is Balkin’s main
example of a digital information fiduciary and because it is the company whose practices have most
galvanized privacy reformers in recent years. Facebook also happens to offer a particularly stark
case study in the inadequacies of the information-fiduciary framework.
15 Balkin, Digital Age, supra note 5.
16 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12; see also Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra
note 5, at 1162 (“End-users are transparent to these organizations, but their operations are not
transparent to end-users, and it is difficult if not impossible to monitor their operations.”).
17 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1207. Throughout this Article, we will use
“beneficiaries” as a catch-all term for those to whom fiduciary obligations are owed.
18 See Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1160 (discussing the development of fiduciary relationships in settings where a “client relies on the fiduciary to perform valuable services” but
“is not well-equipped to understand and monitor the fiduciary’s operations”).
19 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 11.
20 Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note
5, at 1163; Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at 2053; see also Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men:
U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1094–
95 (2019) (echoing Balkin’s “con artist” formulation and surveying how advocates of the informationfiduciary framework have defined the obligations that digital fiduciaries would owe their users).
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the development of “public-oriented” corporate cultures and industry
norms.21 Importantly, Balkin maintains that these goals can be pursued
without running afoul of the First Amendment22 or disrupting “the basic
business model of free or subsidized online services” furnished in exchange for the collection and monetization of user data.23 A fiduciary
approach, in the words of Balkin’s collaborator Professor Jonathan
Zittrain, “protects consumers and corrects a clear market failure without
the need for heavy-handed government intervention.”24
Assessing these claims requires consideration of, among other things,
the legal status quo faced by the relevant companies. Start with corporate law.25 Balkin’s central example of a purported information fiduciary, Facebook, is a Delaware corporation.26 So are his other main examples, Google, Twitter, and Uber.27 Under Delaware law, the officers
and directors of a for-profit corporation already owe fiduciary duties —
to the corporation and its stockholders. Although the doctrinal details
are complex, the core duty of loyalty is fairly straightforward. As the
Court of Chancery explained in 2017, “Delaware case law is clear” that
to act loyally, officers and directors “must, within the limits of [their]
legal discretion, treat stockholder welfare as the only end, considering
other interests only to the extent that doing so is rationally related to
stockholder welfare.”28 Or put another way: “Non-stockholder constituencies and interests can be considered, but only instrumentally, . . .
when giving consideration to them can be justified as benefiting the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21
22
23
24
25
26

Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 11.
See infra section IV.A, pp. 530–34 (reviewing and critiquing this line of argument).
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1227.
Zittrain, How to Exercise, supra note 5.
Part III turns, briefly, to consumer protection and contract law.
See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 6 (Feb. 1, 2012) (listing Delaware
as Facebook’s jurisdiction of incorporation).
27 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 1 (Apr. 29, 2004); Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 9 (Oct. 3, 2013); Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form
S-1), at 13 (Apr. 11, 2019). Additional companies that Balkin has characterized as information
fiduciaries, including Airbnb and OkCupid, are likewise Delaware corporations. See Balkin, Three
Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1230; Airbnb, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form
D) (Mar. 9, 2017); Match Grp., Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 8
(Nov. 9, 2015). Microsoft also makes Balkin’s list and is incorporated in the state of Washington.
See Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV.
979, 1006 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Second Gilded Age]; MICROSOFT CORP., AMENDED AND
RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF MICROSOFT CORPORATION 1 (Nov. 24, 2009);
cf. Shanika Weerasundara, State of the “Incorporation” — Delaware or Washington?, TEQLAA
(Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.teqlaa.com/state-of-the-incorporation-delaware-or-washington [https://
perma.cc/S7G5-749V] (stating that “Washington corporate law is largely similar to Delaware law”
and that “Washington courts often refer to Delaware case law as guidance” in interpreting the
Washington Business Corporation Act).
28 Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 107 (2015)).
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stockholders.”29 In 2013, Delaware created by statute a new category of
corporations, public benefit corporations, whose directors are permitted
to “balance[] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders” against “the
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct”
and other public values.30 The creation of this category reinforces the
conventional view that Delaware fiduciary law simply “does not permit
traditional corporations to consider non-stockholder constituencies.”31
Right off the bat, these observations give reason to question the feasibility, if not also the coherence, of applying the information-fiduciary
idea to the leading social media companies. A fiduciary with sharply
opposed loyalties teeters on the edge of contradiction.32 Insofar as the
interests of stockholders and users diverge, the officers and directors of
these companies may be put in the untenable position of having to violate their fiduciary duties (to stockholders) under Delaware law in order
to fulfill their fiduciary duties (to end users) under the new body of law
that Balkin proposes — at least barring some sort of “heavy-handed
government intervention”33 that clearly prioritizes the latter set of duties.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29 Id. at *17 n.14 (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a ClearEyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 771 (2015)); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that Delaware fiduciary principles
require directors “to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”); Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 61, 64 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds.,
2019) (“In Delaware, at least, . . . a corporate fiduciary’s duties ultimately are owed to the shareholders alone.”).
30 Act of July 17, 2013, ch. 122, § 8, 79 Del. Laws ch. 122, 1, 3 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 365(a) (2019)).
31 ELLEN J. ODONER, STEPHEN A. RADIN, LYUBA A. GOLTSER & ANDREW E.
BLUMBERG, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR GLOB. MKTS & CORP. OWNERSHIP, FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 4 (2017), https://millstein.law.columbia.
edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/105715_millstein_fiduciary_duties.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K5YRYMR]. The extent to which Delaware fiduciary law actually protects shareholders against managerial negligence and self-dealing, compliance failures that result in penalties on the firm, and
other bad behavior by corporate officers has been debated for decades. See generally Velasco, supra
note 29, at 62–63 (discussing the many “compromises” made by corporate fiduciary law to conserve
legal resources and minimize “interference with risky business decisions,” id. at 63). In her response
to this Article, Professor Tamara Piety contends that Delaware law has not proven an effective
deterrent to much of this behavior and that this track record supplies an additional reason for
skepticism about Balkin’s proposal. Tamara Piety, Radical Skepticism About Information Fiduciaries, LAW & POL. ECON. (May 31, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/5/31/radical-skepticism-aboutinformation-fiduciaries [https://perma.cc/757G-ENQT].
32 Cf. Paul B. Miller, Multiple Loyalties and the Conflicted Fiduciary, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 301,
303, 306 (2014) (explaining that the beneficiary’s “right to [the fiduciary’s] loyalty is commonly understood as being an exclusive claim enjoyed by the beneficiary over the exercise of discretionary
power by a fiduciary,” id. at 303, but noting that there are some “difficult” cases in which fiduciaries
are “authorized to act in the face of a known conflict,” id. at 306). We consider in Part II how some
of the standard legal strategies for managing conflicts among classes of beneficiaries might be
mapped onto Balkin’s proposal.
33 Zittrain, How to Exercise, supra note 5.
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It is not hard to imagine how the interests of a social media company’s stockholders and users could come apart. We will return to this
point in section II.B, but just consider for a moment Facebook’s situation. Facebook is primarily a digital advertising venture. It charges
users no monetary price for using the platform and instead makes the
vast majority of its revenue through selling targeted advertising placements to third parties.34 Like other corporations with comparable business models, Facebook therefore has a strong economic incentive to
maximize the amount of time users spend on the site and to collect and
commodify as much user data as possible.35 By and large, addictive
user behavior is good for business.36 Divisive and inflammatory content
is good for business.37 Deterioration of privacy and confidentiality
norms is good for business.38 Reforms to make the site less addictive,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
34 See Facebook’s Annual Revenue from 2009 to 2018, by Segment (in Million U.S. Dollars),
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/267031/facebooks-annual-revenue-by-segment [https://
perma.cc/L2LA-MD4P] (indicating that over 98.5% of Facebook’s total revenue in 2018, more than
$55 billion, came from advertising). This is not true of dating sites or of gig-economy companies
like Uber and Airbnb, which charge customers for services. See, e.g., IAC/Interactive Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 1, 2018); Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 27, at F-30 to F-31.
35 As Balkin notes, “advertising revenues depend on the amount of time and attention spent on
the site.” Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 2.
36 See generally ADAM ALTER, IRRESISTIBLE: THE RISE OF ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGY
AND THE BUSINESS OF KEEPING US HOOKED (2017).
37 See Sue Halpern, Apologize Later, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.
nybooks.com/articles/2019/01/17/facebook-apologize-later [https://perma.cc/E469-NEH8] (“While
the formula [Facebook] came up with was quite simple — growth is a function of engagement — it
so happened that engagement was best served by circulating sensational, divisive, and salacious
content. Allowing discordant and false material on the platform was not a glitch in the business
plan — it was the plan.”); Emily Bell & Taylor Owen, The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley
Reengineered Journalism, TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.
cjr.org/tow_center_reports/platform-press-how-silicon-valley-reengineered-journalism.php [https://
perma.cc/EZ37-BQ7R] (“[T]he structure and the economics of social platforms incentivize the
spread of low-quality content over high-quality material.”); Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein,
Inside the Two Years that Shook Facebook — and the World, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell [https://perma.cc/
7DUP-PFMV] (discussing the growing recognition after the 2016 presidential election “that Facebook
had long helped to create an economic system that rewarded publishers for sensationalism, not
accuracy or depth”).
38 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 19 (2015) (discussing the degree to which social media companies’ data-mining and surveillance practices foster and depend upon “a society of exposure and exhibition,” in which people are
“dulled into not caring” about privacy “because there is ‘nothing to hide’ and ‘no place to hide’”
(first quoting DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE (2011); and then quoting GLENN
GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE (2014))); Bruce Schneier, How We Sold Our Souls — and
More — to the Internet Giants, THE GUARDIAN (May 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2015/may/17/sold-our-souls-and-more-to-internet-giants-privacy-surveillance-bruceschneier [https://perma.cc/TXH6-FDV8] (explaining, with reference to Facebook, that “[s]urveillance is the business model of the internet” and that people’s “tendency to undervalue privacy is
exacerbated by companies deliberately making sure that privacy is not salient to users”).
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to deemphasize sensationalistic material, and to enhance personal privacy would arguably be in the best interests of users. Yet each of these
reforms would also pose a threat to Facebook’s bottom line and therefore to the interests of shareholders.39
Doctors, lawyers, accountants, and the like do not experience such
acute tensions within their sets of fiduciary obligations. Tensions do
arise, both because these fiduciaries may stand to profit from selling
beneficiaries as many products and services as possible (whatever the
beneficiaries’ true needs) and because there may be misalignments
among beneficiaries, as in the case of a financial servicer acting on behalf of multiple investors40 or a law firm partner with fiduciary duties
to her copartners as well as to her clients.41 Some of these fiduciaries
may even be employed by publicly traded companies,42 although most
are not; longstanding rules of professional conduct, for instance, prohibit
nonlawyer ownership of law firms in the United States.43 Yet while
Delaware law allows for directors’ duties to shareholders to be qualified
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 Recent market developments corroborate this concern. In January 2018, Facebook adjusted
its algorithm to favor more content from “friends” and less content from brands and publishers, a
move its CEO promoted as ensuring that time spent on the platform is “time well spent.” Mark
Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:28 PM), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/
10104413015393571 [https://perma.cc/A2MW-UX5N]. Immediately after Facebook announced
that the adjustment had led users to spend less time on the platform, the company’s stock fell by
five percent, “a rare decline for a company that consistently outpaces Wall Street’s estimates.” Seth
Fiegerman, Facebook Users Are Spending Less Time on the Site, CNN (Jan. 31, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://
money.cnn.com/2018/01/31/technology/facebook-earnings/index.html [https://perma.cc/97ZA-3VAY].
40 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867
passim (2010) (discussing this phenomenon); see also Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate
Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 103 (2005) (noting that corporate directors “owe fiduciary duties to
holders of all classes of stock even when the interests of the various classes are in conflict”).
41 See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 399 (1998) (“A lawyer as fiduciary serves two masters — the lawyer’s
partners and the lawyer’s clients. The differing interests of the beneficiaries of a partner’s loyalty
obligation may diverge significantly and even be in conflict.”); cf. Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard
B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and
Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 27 (1989) (describing how debtor-in-possession fiduciaries bear
“not only the obligation to protect the estate, but also the explicit power to make choices that benefit
some claimants and harm others”).
42 Numerous companies that own or operate U.S. hospitals are publicly traded, for example.
See Publicly Traded Healthcare Facilities, INVESTSNIPS, http://investsnips.com/list-of-publiclytraded-healthcare-facilities-blood-banks-emergency-rooms-treatment-facilities-and-urgent-carecenters/ [https://perma.cc/8D5N-K2NK].
43 See Roberta S. Karmel, Will Law Firms Go Public?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 487, 490–91 (2013)
(reviewing these rules and explaining that “[t]he basic concern animating [them] is that permitting
nonlawyer ownership or direction would subject lawyers to meeting the goals of the nonlawyers
rather than meeting their duties to clients,” id. at 491). There has been some debate in recent years
about whether these rules should be relaxed, as they have been in several Commonwealth countries,
but as of now they still hold. See generally id. at 511–25; Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get
All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1 (2016); Elizabeth Olson, A Call for Law Firms to Go Public, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 18,
2015, 8:56 AM), https://nyti.ms/2jBfbxU [https://perma.cc/Z4EN-VKTS].
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by other legal duties,44 and while digital information fiduciaries would
not be unique in facing crosscutting fiduciary obligations, the nature
and scope of the conflicts they would face seem qualitatively distinct.
As Balkin acknowledges, traditional commercial fiduciaries are not
nearly as invested as digital firms in eliciting ongoing personal exposure
from, or monetizing the personal data of, their customers.45 The potential conflicts between equity owners and end users that arise from these
practices are not isolated or incidental but go to the core of the firms’
business.
Traditional fiduciaries are also embedded in thicker relationships of
care. Doctors, lawyers, and accountants have a limited number of patients or clients on whose behalf they perform specialized tasks and exercise judgment, in all cases guided by the beneficiary’s individual preferences and circumstances as well as by shared norms of a knowledge
community.46 Within the context of such relationships, the law is generally able to manage the problem of divided loyalties by requiring fiduciaries to minimize self-dealing and obvious conflicts; to furnish informed disclosure when conflicts are unavoidable; and, above all, to
prioritize the interests of clients and patients over the fiduciary’s own
interests and the interests of any other beneficiaries.47
Would the same legal strategies work for digital information fiduciaries? Can the duties they already owe to stockholders be harmonized
with the new duties they would owe to users without doing too much
violence either to the companies themselves or to fundamental principles
of fiduciary law?
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44 This is the import of the phrase “within the limits of [their] legal discretion” in the passage
quoted earlier. Supra p. 503 (quoting Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108,
2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017)).
45 Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; see also Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5,
at 2049 (contrasting social media companies and search engines, on the one hand, with doctors and
lawyers, on the other, and remarking that the former “will always be tempted to use the data [they
collect] in ways that sacrifice the interests of their end users to the company’s economic or political
interests”).
46 On the idea of professions as knowledge communities, see Claudia E. Haupt, Professional
Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241–42, 1248–54 (2016).
47 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“The
professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised . . . solely for the benefit of his client and free
of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.”); Robert
W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles on the Duties of Partners
Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997, 1031 (1998) (observing that, across
numerous areas of legal practice, “the overriding value of protecting the interests of clients serves
to temper fiduciary duties that run between law partners”); Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses”
or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 269, 348 (2006) (noting that the principle “that the ‘patient’s interest
comes first’” “appears in all medical professionals’ codes of ethics”).
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II. FIDUCIARIES IN WHAT SENSE?
A. Managing Divided Loyalties
Balkin has never squarely addressed the issue of crosscutting loyalties.48 Nor, as far as we can tell, has any other advocate of the informationfiduciary proposal. But it is possible to imagine at least four ways one
might try to reconcile a corporation like Facebook’s fiduciary obligations
to stockholders with fiduciary obligations to end users.
First, it might be argued that Delaware law does not categorically
demand that the interests of equity owners (or the corporation itself,
understood in some distinct sense49) be prioritized over the interests of
other constituencies. If this were true, then perhaps a Facebook director’s duties to stockholders could simply be subordinated to her duties
to users when the two collide, much like a law firm partner’s duties to
her fellow partners must sometimes give way to her duties to clients.
The fundamental flaw in this argument, however, is that it runs counter
to the prevailing understanding of Delaware doctrine — which, according to the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, “could not have
been more clear” since the mid-1980s “that directors of a for-profit corporation must at all times pursue the best interests of the corporation’s
stockholders.”50
Second, it might be argued that reforms to advance the best interests
of users by reducing addiction, limiting advertising, protecting privacy,
and so on would also advance the best interests of an online platform
and its shareholders, for instance because fostering trust in the present
period may make it easier to retain and recruit users in future periods.
Delaware law broadly permits, and on some accounts even requires, directors to take a long-run perspective.51 The fact that corporations like
Facebook have persistently declined to self-regulate along such lines,52
however, suggests that their boards do not see these reforms as likely to
enhance firm value or shareholder wealth either in the short term or in
the long term.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
48
49

Indeed, the term “Delaware” does not appear once in any of Balkin’s writings in this area.
See generally Robert Bartlett & Eric Talley, Law and Corporate Governance, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 177, 194–99 (Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017) (discussing the persistent “ambiguity” in Delaware
fiduciary law about how to handle situations in which “the interests of the corporation writ large”
appear to diverge from “the short-term interests of its common shareholders”).
50 Strine, supra note 29, at 771.
51 See ODONER, RADIN, GOLTSER & BLUMBERG, supra note 31, at 4.
52 See, e.g., DIG., CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT COMM., U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS,
DISINFORMATION AND “FAKE NEWS”: FINAL REPORT 20–42 (2019), https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC89-M39T] (detailing how Facebook has repeatedly taken actions that increased revenue at the expense of users’
privacy and data security).
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Third, as alluded to above,53 corporate law might be modified
through state or federal legislation to authorize or compel platforms to
put users’ interests ahead of stockholders’ interests (either in general or
in specific respects). In a much-noted 2016 essay in The Atlantic, Balkin
and Zittrain call for a preemptive federal statute to strike “a new, grand
bargain organized around the idea of fiduciary responsibility.”54 As they
describe it, however, the state and local laws this statute would displace
are not laws about shareholder primacy but rather “laws about online
privacy.”55 At no point has Balkin or Zittrain indicated that their proposal would require modification of companies’ existing fiduciary duties
to accommodate new duties to users.
On the contrary, information-fiduciary advocates generally appear
to endorse a fourth and final strategy for managing conflicts between
stockholders and users, which is to cabin any fiduciary duties afforded
to users so that they do not seriously threaten firm value — and thus
might even be implemented by judges in the absence of legislation.56
Balkin has stated repeatedly that the new obligations he would impose
on entities like Facebook, Google, and Twitter are “more limited” than
the obligations imposed on lawyers, doctors, and accountants.57 One
way to understand this formulation is as an effort to elicit better behavior from digital companies without undermining the shareholderprimacy norm. If traditional professional fiduciaries must temper their
duties to any other beneficiaries with a higher duty of loyalty to patients
and clients, it seems that Facebook, Google, and Twitter would, as a
rule, have to temper their duties to users with a higher duty of loyalty
to shareholders. Delaware law would remain unaffected. The interests
of shareholders would still come first.58
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
53
54
55
56

See supra p. 504.
Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5.
Id.
It is unclear whether, and how, Balkin believes judges could implement his proposal on their
own, without prior statutory or regulatory reform, but certain passages seem to hold out the possibility of a lead role for courts in creating as well as enforcing new fiduciary obligations. See, e.g.,
Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 15 (asserting that one advantage of the fiduciary
approach is “[i]t can be implemented . . . by judges, legislatures, or administrative agencies”);
Balkin, Digital Age, supra note 5 (suggesting that “common law courts,” as distinct from “the state,”
might “treat online service providers as information fiduciaries”).
57 E.g., Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries,
supra note 5, at 1226; Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12.
58 For the reasons given in the main text, this strikes us as the most natural reading of the
literature to date. In recent conversations, Balkin has informed us that he assumes the corporatelaw fiduciary duties owed by digital platform directors would have to be curtailed in important
respects to operationalize his proposal. That is, Balkin embraces some version of the third strategy
on our list. We will consider this Article a (partial) success if it pushes Balkin and other advocates
of the information-fiduciary idea to clarify their position here — and to grapple explicitly with the
question of whether and to what extent they envision sacrificing stockholders’ economic interests
to advance users’ noneconomic interests.
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Pursuant to this strategy, reformers may indeed be able to mitigate
the problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations and purchase legal
coherence — but at a steep price. For if the concept of digital information fiduciaries does not require online platforms to place their users’
interests above all other interests, it is unclear what work the concept is
supposed to be doing. More than that, it is unclear how this is a fiduciary approach in any meaningful sense.
B. Online Behavioral Advertising and the
Implausibility of Putting Users First
Balkin is quick to emphasize that fiduciary duties are not one-sizefits-all in the law and that they can and do vary from context to context.59 This is true, but within limits. The one thing that does not vary,
in contexts where professional firms owe fiduciary duties to individual
customers, is that the fiduciary always must act in the customer’s best
interest. As Zittrain himself has written, “at its core [a fiduciary relationship] means that the professionals are obliged to place their clients’
interests ahead of their own.”60
Abandon this core tenet, and it is unclear what is left of the legal
analogy to doctors, lawyers, accountants, and estate managers. The
social media executive who is exhorted to treat users well (and prohibited from engaging in certain especially egregious behaviors) yet not
required to place users’ interests first resembles, instead, the used-car
dealers and restaurateurs who are classic examples in the case law of
service providers who are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their customers.61 “Although each of these relationships involves significant information asymmetries,” as Professor Evan Criddle has explained, “the
relationships are all presumptively arm’s-length; none by definition

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
59 See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1223 (“[A] changing society generates new kinds of fiduciary relations and fiduciary obligations that the law can and should recognize. The scope of the fiduciary duty, however, is not the same for every entity.”); Balkin, Digital
Age, supra note 5 (“[T]here are many types of fiduciary duties.”).
60 Zittrain, Fix This Mess, supra note 5; see also Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(citing Winter v. Anderson, 275 N.Y.S. 373, 376 (App. Div. 1934)) (“The fiduciary must subordinate
his individual and private interests to his duty to the corporation whenever the two conflict.”); John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1658 (1989) (describing as the “central conceptual difference” between
contracting parties and fiduciaries “that a contracting party may seek to advance his own interests
in good faith while a fiduciary may not”); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory
of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 350 (2009) (“In all cases the fundamental fiduciary duty is
to exercise the entrusted power exclusively for the other-regarding purposes for which it is held or
conferred.”).
61 See Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L.
REV. 993, 1041 (2017).
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involves an entrustment of power from one party to another to be exercised under a purposive and other-regarding mandate.”62 Again, the
United States Congress or the Delaware General Assembly could impose
a broad user-regarding mandate on social media companies and thereby
try to create duties of loyalty and care where none currently exist. But
to succeed in this effort and wind up with anything recognizable as a
fiduciary relationship, it seems to us that the legislators would have to
force fundamental changes in the companies’ business practices —
changes that information-fiduciary advocates have suggested are unnecessary and unwarranted63 — and preempt or dilute the stockholderregarding norms under which the companies currently operate.
Part III will consider the practices that digital information fiduciaries, on Balkin’s account, would be barred from engaging in. But Balkin
is clear that at least one core practice would survive his reforms: the
selling of targeted advertisements tied to personally identifiable information.64 This concession alone highlights how strained the fiduciary
designation is here. A business model built around behavioral advertising65 demands that companies like Facebook assemble a maximally
detailed portrait of their users’ lives, which the companies then sell to
marketers and developers.66 While targeted advertising is not new, the
internet has vastly expanded its scope and sophistication. Advertising

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
62 Id. “The injuries that arise within these relationships can be remedied,” accordingly, through
nonfiduciary regimes “such as contract law, tort law, property law, and criminal law.” Id.
63 See supra notes 19–24, 54–58 and accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1227 (“It cannot be the case that
the basic business model of free or subsidized online services inherently violates fiduciary obligations . . . .”); Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12 (“Social media companies and search
engines provide free services in exchange for the right to collect and analyze personal data and
serve targeted ads. This by itself does not violate fiduciary obligations.”).
65 The Federal Trade Commission has defined online behavioral advertising as the practice,
“typically invisible to consumers,” of “tracking . . . consumers’ online activities in order to deliver
tailored advertising” that is more closely aligned with their “inferred interests.” FTC, FTC STAFF
REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2
(2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staffreport-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400behavadreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BFC3-3ECA].
66 Facebook denies that it sells user data to third parties. But as Professor Michal Kosinski has
pointed out, any time a user clicks on an advertisement, Facebook automatically reveals facets of
the user’s identity to the advertiser by virtue of the fact that the advertiser has paid Facebook to
target specific types of individuals. Michal Kosinski, Opinion, Congress May Have Fallen for
Facebook’s Trap, but You Don’t Have To, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2zV3ih0
[https://perma.cc/S49N-UR6M]. And as Professor Chris Hoofnagle has observed, Facebook also
grants developers access to user data, a form of exchange that he argues should also be considered
a “sale.” Chris Hoofnagle, Facebook and Google Are the New Data Brokers, DIGITAL LIFE
INITIATIVE @ CORNELL TECH (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.dli.tech.cornell.edu/blog/facebookand-google-are-the-new-data-brokers [https://perma.cc/6YFK-9NQK].
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of this sort may have some benefits.67 Balkin asserts that it “allows more
efficient advertising campaigns” and can “give social media [companies]
opportunities to structure and curate content for end users that they will
find most engaging and interesting.”68 Yet, as long as such companies
make most of their money through personally targeted advertisements,
they will be economically motivated to extract as much data from their
users as they can — a motivation that runs headfirst into users’ privacy
interests as well as any interests users might have in exercising behavioral autonomy or ensuring that their personal data is not stolen, sold,
mined, or otherwise monetized down the line.69
Balkin acknowledges that permitting online providers to collect personal data and serve targeted advertisements “creates a perpetual conflict of interest” between the providers and their users.70 Rather than
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 Experts debate whether and under what conditions online behavioral advertising actually
enhances consumer welfare. See, e.g., Veronica Marotta, Kaifu Zhang & Alessandro Acquisti, Who
Benefits from Targeted Advertising? 2–5 (Oct. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00037-100312.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8BZ3-V8NW] (reviewing potential costs and “benefits of increasingly widespread and
precise collection and usage of consumer data for the targeting of online ads,” id. at 2, and developing a model that suggests consumer welfare is generally higher “when less information is exchanged” with advertisers, id. at 5 (emphasis added)).
68 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 2.
69 Some predict that the GDPR will lead to fundamental changes in the business models of
Facebook and other behavioral-advertising-based companies, at least in the European Union. See,
e.g., Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a New
Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 2018, at 1, 109, https://jolt.richmond.
edu/files/2018/11/Houser_Voss-FE.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX8S-LNT9] (arguing that the GDPR
“may be an end to Facebook and Google as they currently operate”); Paul M. Schwartz & KarlNikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 143 (2017) (stating that the
GDPR’s ban on tying, or the extension of “terms within a single contractual agreement . . . to
include processing of personal data beyond that which is necessary to the purpose of the contract,”
“takes aim at myriad new digital business models based around data trade”); Henry Farrell &
Abraham Newman, Here’s How Europe’s Data Privacy Law Could Take Down Facebook, WASH.
POST: MONKEY CAGE (May 25, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/05/25/heres-how-europes-gdpr-may-take-down-facebook [https://perma.cc/GQV2DL65] (“Privacy activist Max Schrems and his new organization . . . have used the GDPR to launch
four major court cases against Facebook and its subsidiaries. If Schrems’s interpretation prevails,
Facebook’s business model will be fundamentally challenged.”). It is too early to assess these predictions. But it is worth noting that while Facebook’s user growth in Europe initially slowed after
the GDPR took effect in May 2018, it has since rebounded — without any evident changes to the
company’s core business model. See Elizabeth Schulze, Facebook’s User Growth in Europe Is
Bouncing Back, Defying Stricter Privacy Laws, CNBC (Apr. 25, 2019, 8:11 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/25/facebook-q1-2019-user-growth-in-europe-is-bouncing-backdespite-gdpr.html [https://perma.cc/CM5J-BAUE]. Facebook is currently the subject of numerous
GDPR-related investigations, including eleven by the Irish Data Protection Commission. See
Elizabeth Schulze, Facebook’s EU Regulator Says It “Remains to Be Seen” if Mark Zuckerberg Is Serious About Privacy, CNBC (June 13, 2019, 6:26 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/13/facebookinvestigations-by-eu-ireland-regulator-nearing-conclusions.html [https://perma.cc/3NKE-KEMN].
70 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12; see also Balkin, Information Fiduciaries,
supra note 5, at 1226 (“The value of end-user data, and its centrality in the business models of many
online service providers, creates an inherent potential for conflicts of interest between the digital
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see this as an insuperable obstacle to a fiduciary relationship, however,
he submits that “the goal should be to ameliorate or forestall conflicts of
interest.”71 “[T]he law should limit how social media companies can
make money off their end users, just as the law limits how other fiduciaries can make money off their clients and beneficiaries.”72 Sketching
out what these limits might look like, Zittrain suggests that a digital
information fiduciary would be prohibited from harnessing user data to
enable “predatory” advertisements but permitted to expose users to nonpredatory advertisements.73
Even if we accept for argument’s sake the soundness of the predatory/
nonpredatory distinction in this context — although we are doubtful74 — it is unclear how a digital fiduciary is supposed to fulfill its duty
of loyalty to users under conditions of profound and “perpetual” conflict.
Fiduciary theorists debate the best way to conceptualize the duty of
loyalty. On thicker, “prescriptive” accounts, a loyal fiduciary must not
only avoid conflicts of interest but also act with “affirmative devotion”75
or “obedience”76 toward her beneficiary. On thinner, “proscriptive”
accounts, the fiduciary must “avoid conflicts between pursuit of his selfinterest and fulfilment of his duty to act for the benefit of the beneficiary” and “between this duty and the pursuit of others’ interests.”77
Even under this less demanding theory of loyalty, fiduciary law cannot
tolerate an arrangement that places the fiduciary’s economic livelihood
and its beneficiaries’ well-being fundamentally at odds. The whole
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
company and the end-user.”); Zittrain, Fix This Mess, supra note 5 (“It may be that aspects of an
advertising-based business model are indeed incompatible with ethically serving users . . . .”).
71 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 13.
72 Id.
73 See Zittrain, How to Exercise, supra note 5 (“A fiduciary duty wouldn’t broadly rule out
targeted advertising — dog owners would still get dog food ads — but it would preclude predatory
advertising, like promotions for payday loans.”).
74 Cf. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 90 (2019) (“The word ‘targeted’ is another
euphemism. It evokes notions of precision, efficiency, and competence. Who would guess that
targeting conceals a new political equation in which Google’s concentrations of computational
power brush aside users’ decision rights as easily as King Kong might shoo away an ant, all accomplished offstage where no one can see?”); Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Are More Complex
Than It Lets On, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebookstargeted-ads-are-more-complex-than-it-lets-on [https://perma.cc/ZG2Y-WYJX] (noting that “companies who use Facebook have a near-endless number of data points with which to target their
ads,” allowing them to pick out “hyper-specific audiences with extreme precision,” and that users
are “significantly more likely to click on . . . psychologically tailored ads”); Piety, supra note 31
(“[L]ine drawing between [online] advertising that is ‘abusive’ or ‘manipulative,’ versus that which
is not, . . . will not be easy: it is virtually all manipulative.”).
75 Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 557
(2015).
76 Id. at 558.
77 Id. at 557 (quoting Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 257
(2011)).
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point of proscriptive rules implementing the duty of loyalty is to minimize “biasing factors that might induce the fiduciary to subjugate the
interests of beneficiaries” to any other end.78
To appreciate just how odd it is to think that a behavioral-advertising
company could be a fiduciary for its users, imagine visiting a doctor —
let’s call her Marta Zuckerberg — whose main source of income is enabling third parties to market you goods and services. Instead of requesting monetary payment for services rendered, Dr. Zuckerberg floods you
(and her two billion other patients) with ads for all manner of pills and
procedures from the second you set foot in her office, and she gets paid
every time you try to learn more about one of these ads or even look in
their direction. In fact, this is just about the only way she gets paid —
as her financial backers are apt to remind her. The ads themselves,
moreover, are tightly tailored to your economic, demographic, and psychological profile and to any consumer frailties you exhibit.79 They are
also continually updated in light of information Dr. Zuckerberg collects
on you; to be sure she does not miss anything, she has planted surveillance devices all around your neighborhood as well as her office.80 Can
this institutional sociology and incentive structure plausibly be reconciled with a commitment to prioritizing your health?81
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
78
79

Id.
See generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).
Dr. Zuckerberg may even assign scores to patients based on their susceptibility to certain sorts of
ads, and then share those scores with third parties. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
Pasquale, Essay, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2014).
80 Your data, accordingly, is the payment you make to Dr. Zuckerberg. Cf. Shoshana Zuboff,
The Real Reason Why Facebook and Google Won’t Change, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90303274/why-facebook-and-google-wont-change [https://perma.cc/
39HN-Q5DD] (“Users [of Facebook] are not customers . . . . They are merely free sources of
raw material.”).
81 Consider, by way of contrast with this hypothetical, the rules limiting real-life doctors from
receiving gifts valued at $100 or more from pharmaceutical-company sales representatives. See
Elaine K. Howley, Do Drug Company Payments to Doctors Influence Which Drugs They Prescribe?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 31, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/
patient-advice/articles/2018-08-31/do-drug-company-payments-to-doctors-influence-which-drugsthey-prescribe [https://perma.cc/E387-9JFA] (describing these rules). Of course, Facebook is not a
health care provider, and prioritizing a medical patient’s interests may require very different activities and assurances than prioritizing a social network user’s interests. Our point is simply that
unlike doctors, Facebook does not come close to putting its customers first in any serious sense —
notwithstanding Zuckerberg’s protestations to the contrary, see, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, Opinion,
The Facts About Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/thefacts-about-facebook-11548374613 [https://perma.cc/U4Y6-6AP6] — and that this follows from the
structure of its business.
Apart from the business model, perhaps the most basic distinction between a real-life doctor
and Facebook is that a doctor is a trained professional who makes individualized judgments,
whereas Facebook is an automated communications network. We bracket in this Article the deep
questions raised by the notion that a fiduciary’s relationship with its beneficiaries could be mediated
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In other words, the business model matters. It determines the degree
to which a commercial enterprise is motivated to advance the best interests of its customers, or the exact opposite. Although the economic
incentives of commercial fiduciaries will sometimes diverge from the interests of their customers and raise difficult issues at the margins —
truly perfect alignment might obviate the need for fiduciary duties in
the first place82 — there are cases where the degree of misalignment
renders fiduciary loyalty implausible. Businesses built on behaviorally
targeted advertising appear to be one such case.
Moreover, if Balkin’s fiduciary obligations may be too weak or too
compromised where they apply, one might also worry that they do not
apply widely enough. Balkin never discusses the advertisers or content
producers who rely on social media companies such as Facebook. Nor
does he discuss the millions of nonusers whose data is systematically
swept up by Facebook through user uploads of phone and email contacts83 and through “sites that use Facebook’s advertising pixel or other
social APIs linking back to Facebook.”84 Like Facebook’s end users,
these parties surrender to Facebook certain forms of information that
they have an interest in keeping private. Facebook, however, has an
economic incentive to monetize this information as well. For example,
even though an advertiser is unlikely to want its marketing campaign
data to be shared with competitors, Facebook may incorporate this data
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
almost entirely by computer algorithms, although we note that Balkin’s theory is potentially vulnerable on this ground as well. As Professor Julie Cohen puts it in a response piece:
Classic fiduciaries — doctors, lawyers, priests — operated on small scales and at human
rhythms for a reason. The fiduciary construct implies a mutual encounter predicated on
the knowability of human beings as human beings, with mutually intelligible desires and
needs. The information fiduciaries proposal abstracts speed, immanence, automaticity,
and scale away from that encounter and then assumes they never mattered in the first
place.
Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, LAW & POL. ECON. (May 29, 2019),
https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/29/scaling-trust-and-other-fictions [https://perma.cc/C65Z-75J3].
82 Cf. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 811 (1983) (“When the fiduciary’s
interests coincide with those of the entrustor, the entrustor is partially protected because as the
fiduciary acts in his own interest he will automatically act in the interest of the entrustor. . . . The
fiduciary may have an incentive to abuse his power, however, if the loss from the joint enterprise is
smaller than his gain from abuse of his power.”).
83 See Kashmir Hill, How Facebook Figures Out Everyone You’ve Ever Met, GIZMODO (Nov. 7,
2017, 9:39 AM), https://gizmodo.com/how-facebook-figures-out-everyone-youve-ever-met-1819822691
[https://perma.cc/E9CG-V8K8].
84 Kurt Wagner, This Is How Facebook Collects Data on You Even if You Don’t Have an Account,
VOX: RECODE (Apr. 20, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/20/17254312/facebookshadow-profiles-data-collection-non-users-mark-zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/7GAG-J8EZ]; see
also David Ingram, Facebook Fuels Broad Privacy Debate by Tracking Non-Users, REUTERS (Apr.
15, 2018, 7:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-privacy-tracking/facebook-fuelsbroad-privacy-debate-by-tracking-non-users-idUSKBN1HM0DR [https://perma.cc/FZ2M-LM22]
(“Facebook often installs cookies on non-users’ browsers if they visit sites with Facebook ‘like’ and
‘share’ buttons, whether or not a person pushes a button.”); Wagner, supra (“There is no way to opt
out of this kind of data collection.”).
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into its algorithms regardless — thereby passing on to rivals the benefits
of the advertiser’s proprietary information. Many advertisers and content producers are just as captive to Facebook as its end users are, or
even more so. Insofar as the purpose of the information-fiduciary proposal is to rebalance the relationship between dominant online intermediaries and those who depend on them, it is unclear why its protections
should cover only one set of dependents.
C. Constructed Vulnerability
Beyond their reliance on targeted advertising, certain online platforms have other features that strain the fiduciary paradigm. Balkin
notes that a hallmark of the expertise-based fiduciary relationships on
which he focuses is that the fiduciary stands in a position of power over
the beneficiary.85 The sources of this relational power are typically twofold. First, the fiduciary possesses professional skills and competencies
that the beneficiary lacks. This explains both why the beneficiary is
seeking the fiduciary’s services and why she is hampered in monitoring
the fiduciary’s conduct. Second, obtaining the fiduciary’s services requires the beneficiary to disclose personal information that the fiduciary
could potentially abuse.86 The fiduciary’s expertise and the beneficiary’s vulnerability are thus interrelated in a deep sense.
Balkin suggests that end users’ relationships with online platforms
involve a similar combination of (1) valuable expertise and (2) personal
exposure necessary to enlist that expertise.87 Each proposition warrants
scrutiny.
Whether an online platform offers expertise may vary. In the case
of Facebook, users are offered, first and foremost, access to a communications network, a vast infrastructure for social and economic
exchange.88 Facebook employs hundreds of skilled professionals, such
as the software engineers who create and maintain its database applications and search functions. But so do automobile manufacturers, oil and
gas outfits, and any number of other firms not traditionally seen as
fiduciaries for their customers. Expertise underwrites commercial fiduciary law only insofar as it enables specialized, individualized judgments
and services to be rendered on the beneficiary’s behalf. Individuated
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
85
86

See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1216–17.
See id.; see also Frankel, supra note 82, at 810 (“The delegated power that enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the entrustor, because the purpose for which
the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated power is narrower than the purposes for which he is
capable of using that power.”).
87 See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1222 (“[E]nd-users’ relationships
with many online service providers involve significant vulnerability, because online service providers have considerable expertise and knowledge and end-users usually do not. Online service providers have lots of information about us, and we have very little information about them . . . .”).
88 Cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1669 (2018) (describing Facebook,
Google, and Amazon as leading “examples of online-enabled infrastructure for the modern economy”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661

2019]

A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES

517

experience on Facebook is largely limited to choosing certain settings
and inputting certain information (friends requested, groups joined,
posts “liked”), which trigger a series of automated responses. Maintaining a twenty-first-century version of the Yellow Pages coupled with a
communications infrastructure and search database requires significant
technical expertise, to be sure, but not the kind of expertise that has
helped justify fiduciary relationships in the past.
The one Facebook service that has involved a more context-sensitive
form of judgment is content moderation. Content moderation refers to
the practice of establishing and enforcing a set of rules to govern which
kinds of speech are permitted on a platform.89 Facebook’s content moderators, however, do not apply their judgment for the benefit of any
given user. Rather, they are called upon to protect community standards
and the economic viability of the platform as a whole.90 In this way, an
online content moderator is more akin to a traffic cop — applying rules
that benefit the collective and keep traffic flowing — than to a doctor
or a lawyer. The fact that Facebook outsources the vast majority of its
content moderation jobs,91 moreover, is some indication that it does not
view the service as a core part of the business.92
What about exposure? Here, too, the nature of the problem is notably distinct. Unlike in the case of obtaining legal advice or medical care,
the sharing of intimate personal information with the provider is not a
functional prerequisite to accessing Facebook or any other social media
network. It is the price the online providers have chosen to set. Doctors
and lawyers need to learn sensitive details about the individuals who
engage their services to be able to serve them well. Social media companies do not.
The loss of privacy and control experienced by Facebook users therefore does not stem, organically, “from the structure and nature of the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 For an overview and analysis of how platforms like Facebook moderate user-generated content, see Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1630–62 (2018).
90 See, e.g., id. at 1625 (“Platforms create rules and systems to curate speech out of a sense of
corporate social responsibility, but also, more importantly, because their economic viability depends
on meeting users’ speech and community norms.”).
91 See Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor, THE VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-moderator-interviewstrauma-working-conditions-arizona [https://perma.cc/6L87-EYUB] (detailing the psychological
trauma that contractors may endure as part of their content moderation jobs, which pay a fraction
of what full-time Facebook employees make); Queenie Wong, Facebook Content Moderation Is an
Ugly Business.
Here’s Who Does It, CNET (June 19, 2019, 12:53 PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-content-moderation-is-an-ugly-business-heres-who-does-it
[https://perma.cc/DHQ9-GVMD] (listing companies that have contracted with Facebook to provide
content moderation).
92 Cf. ZUBOFF, supra note 74, at 508–09 (discussing the secretive, “outcast function of ‘content
moderation,’” id. at 508, which always “operates at a distance from the corporation’s core functions,” id. at 509).
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fiduciary relation.”93 It stems from Facebook’s deliberate efforts to create such vulnerabilities. Facebook’s dominant market position supports
this strategy. To the extent that users feel beholden to Facebook, it is
not because the company offers them especially skillful services or judgments so much as because of a lack of viable alternatives.94 By virtue
of owning four of the top five social media applications, Facebook makes
it difficult to escape the company’s ecosystem.95 As legal scholars96 and
German antitrust authorities97 have concluded, this market position enables Facebook to extract more data from its users — who often feel they
have nowhere else to go — and thereby compounds their vulnerability.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
93
94

Frankel, supra note 82, at 810 (emphasis omitted).
This raises another point of disanalogy with traditional professional fiduciaries: unlike
Balkin’s information fiduciaries, traditional fiduciaries not only tend to “operate[] on small scales,”
Cohen, supra note 81, but they also generally face meaningful competition, see Frankel, supra note
82, at 814–15. The need to compete with others in their profession gives doctors and lawyers a
business reason to serve the interests of their beneficiaries. This is especially true today, when
patients and clients can publicly post ratings and reviews. Dominant digital platforms, by contrast,
operate in concentrated markets. While the targeted-advertising-based business model of these
platforms creates (from a user’s perspective) bad incentives, the underlying market structure attenuates good incentives.
95 In 2017, the top five most popular social media applications were WhatsApp, Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, and Snapchat. Michael Grothaus, Facebook Owns Four of the Five Most Downloaded Apps in 2017, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/4035007/
facebook-owns-four-of-the-five-most-downloaded-apps-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/PT9G-MAUG].
Facebook purchased Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014. See Nathan Reiff, Top Companies
Owned by Facebook, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/
personal-finance/051815/top-11-companies-owned-facebook.asp [https://perma.cc/4AFP-XGJC].
In 2013, Facebook reportedly attempted to purchase Snapchat, but Snapchat rebuffed the offer.
See John Shinal, Mark Zuckerberg Couldn’t Buy Snapchat Years Ago, and Now He’s Close to Destroying the Company, CNBC (July 14, 2017, 6:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/12/howmark-zuckerberg-has-used-instagram-to-crush-evan-spiegels-snap.html
[https://perma.cc/P6FFF6U4]. Users who decided to leave Facebook in light of recent privacy breaches discovered to their
dismay that cutting it out entirely would require deleting Instagram and WhatsApp as well. See
Will Oremus, If You Delete Facebook, Do You Also Have to Delete Instagram and WhatsApp?,
SLATE (Dec. 22, 2018, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/12/can-you-deletefacebook-ifyou-dont-also-delete-instagram-and-whatsapp.html [https://perma.cc/2LQ7-P5XG]; see also id. (“After all, the unfortunate reality is that there aren’t a lot of prominent social networks that Facebook
doesn’t own.”).
96 See Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards
Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39,
40 (2019) (arguing that Facebook’s ability to extract so much data from users “is merely this titan’s
form of monopoly rents”).
97 See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining
User Data from Different Sources 2 (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/
Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=2
[https://perma.cc/A527-RYHE] [hereinafter Bundeskartellamt Press Release] (describing a February
2019 decision by the German national competition regulator concluding that “[t]he extent to which
Facebook collects, merges[,] and uses data in user accounts constitutes an abuse of a dominant
position”). In August 2019, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf issued a preliminary ruling
suspending the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook decision. See Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf Aug.
26, 2019, VI-Kart 1/19, http://www.olg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20190826_
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By glossing over these points of disanalogy with doctors and lawyers,
Balkin’s proposal risks obscuring the contingent and constructed character of the power imbalances that exist between ordinary individuals
and the major online providers — imbalances that stem both from the
business model these firms employ and from the market dominance they
enjoy. This blind spot, in turn, risks foreclosing a broader discussion
about interventions that might prevent those imbalances from arising in
the first place.
D. First-Order and Second-Order Information Asymmetries
Implicit in the discussion above, traditional fiduciary relationships
are marked by asymmetries of information. The duty of loyalty responds to these asymmetries by committing the fiduciary to the beneficiary’s best interests and thereby allowing the beneficiary “to take advantage of the [fiduciary’s] superior information and expertise” without
having “to expend significant resources to monitor the [fiduciary’s] behavior.”98 In justifying his proposal, Balkin emphasizes that there are
“strong asymmetries of information” between end users and online platforms, whose “operations, algorithms, and collection practices are mostly
kept secret” and might be hard to interpret even if they were disclosed.99
Balkin is surely right about this.
Yet not all information asymmetries are asymmetric in the same way.
We might describe the information asymmetries that obtain in traditional fiduciary settings as second-order asymmetries: while the beneficiary may not grasp or even hear about any number of technical details
concerning the fiduciary’s efforts on her behalf, she understands the core
terms of their relationship.100 This shared understanding enables the
beneficiary to give meaningful consent and, in many cases, to exercise

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
PM_Facebook/20190826-Beschluss-VI-Kart-1-19-_V_.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTY4-7PPJ], translated in OLG Düsseldorf on Facebook, 26 August 2019, a Non-Translation, D’KART (Aug. 26, 2019),
https://www.d-kart.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OLG-D%C3%BCsseldorf-Facebook-2019English-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ3W-7E8Y]. The Bundeskartellamt is currently appealing the
regional court’s ruling to the Federal Court of Justice. See Sara Germano, Facebook Wins Appeal
Against German Data-Collection Ban, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:04 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wins-appeal-against-german-data-collection-ban-11566835967
[https://perma.cc/U6YW-UQYA].
98 Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients
and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 390 (1990); see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1244 (1995) (“[I]n fiduciary law, the duty of loyalty is
grounded in asymmetric information.”).
99 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1226.
100 Cf. Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 185–86, 192–93 (1999)
(distinguishing analogously between “[f]irst-order secrecy” and “second-order publicity,” id. at 185).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661

520

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:497

some control over the fiduciary’s behavior.101 It also identifies the dimension along which the fiduciary is obligated to serve the beneficiary.
Because a patient (say) is seeking medical services, the doctor’s duty is
to protect and promote the patient’s health interests.
What happens when the service provider and the customer lack this
shared understanding of the core terms of their relationship? We might
describe the information asymmetries that obtain in some of the digital
settings in question as first-order asymmetries: beyond the technical details of an online platform’s operations, algorithms, and data collection
practices, the typical user does not even understand — much less approve of — their basic contours. Most Facebook users, to stick with
Balkin’s main example, rely on the platform to communicate with other
Facebook users. According to a recent Pew Research Center survey,
seventy-four percent of them do not know that the platform collects data
to classify their interests and traits.102 Other surveys have found that
an overwhelming majority of Facebook users do not want to be exposed
to any targeted political or commercial advertisements, reflecting a “resounding consumer rejection of surveillance-based ads and content.”103
As a rule, it appears that Facebook users tend to be deeply ignorant of
the ways the company serves (or disserves) them, and deeply unnerved
when they find out.
This is not just an unusually stark asymmetry of information. It is
an elaborate system of social control whose terms are more imposed than
chosen. Seen in this light, the idea that the law could convert such
companies into fiduciaries for their users without the need for fundamental restructuring looks even more far-fetched.
III. SOLVING WHICH PROBLEMS?
If the information-fiduciary proposal would not disrupt the basic
business model of online platforms, what would it do to advance users’
interests? And how exactly would the new fiduciary duties be enforced?
Balkin is strikingly unclear on these questions. Reconstructing his potential answers gives still more reason to doubt that a fiduciary characterization is appropriate or that his proposal is adequate to the problems
at hand.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
101 Cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 271 (2010) (“‘Second-order’ publicity
rules . . . give citizens a platform for participating in the development of ‘first-order’ secrets, which
affords them a degree of comprehension and control.” (quoting Thompson, supra note 100, at 185)).
102 Lee Rainie, Facebook Algorithms and Personal Data, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 16, 2019),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2019/01/16/facebook-algorithms-and-personal-data
[https://perma.cc/5494-DJHC].
103 Joseph Turow & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg’s Delusion of Consumer
Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2Sczvup [https://perma.cc/K77W-VMED].
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A. Substantive Issues
Supporters of the information-fiduciary proposal have touted the
“many benefits”104 and “enormous consequences”105 its adoption would
bring. On closer inspection, however, the main prescriptions that Balkin
associates with the proposal turn out not to require fiduciary law or
theory at all. Balkin has repeatedly suggested, for instance, that treating
digital companies as information fiduciaries will prevent them from acting like “con artists” toward their users.106 But deception is already
prohibited by a suite of state and federal consumer protection statutes,107 as well as by common law antifraud doctrines108 and ordinary
contract law, which imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing that
(unlike many fiduciary duties) may not be waived or contracted away
even in arm’s-length transactions.109 When Google was accused in the
early 2010s of acting like a con artist by biasing its search results in
favor of its own services and passing off content from competing websites as its own, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted “a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
104
105

Bloomberg Editorial, supra note 9.
Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 11 (2018).
106 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. “At base,” Balkin recently stated, “the obligations
of loyalty mean that digital fiduciaries may not act like con artists.” Balkin, Fixing Social Media,
supra note 5, at 13.
107 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (declaring unlawful all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce,” id. § 45(a)(1), and empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
prevent such acts and practices); Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 165–67 (2011) (noting that many state
mini-FTC Acts are broader than the federal analog in their definitions of unlawful conduct, the
remedies they afford, and their provision of private rights of action); Jim Rossi, Dynamic Incorporation of Federal Law, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 463 (2016) (“Many state consumer protection agencies
operate under ‘mini-FTC Acts’ that incorporate [FTC] definitions of ‘unfair,’ ‘deceptive,’ or ‘misleading’ trade practices.”). See generally Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State
Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016) (describing the proactive role of state
attorneys general in enforcing privacy norms under state unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices laws); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (describing the FTC’s growing role since the late 1990s in enforcing
both privacy statutes and companies’ privacy policies).
108 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 9
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014).
109 See Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied
Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469,
1469–80 (2005) (observing that, while fiduciary duties may be modified by contract under Delaware
law, “[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract law may not be waived or
contracted away by the parties to an agreement,” id. at 1480); see also Paul MacMahon, Good Faith
and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2051, 2065 (2015) (“The duty
of good faith and fair dealing has been invoked in several thousand [contemporary U.S. contract]
cases, often successfully. And the duty has sometimes served as the basis for strikingly liberal
impositions of liability.”). Standard legal definitions of good faith invoke the “absence of intent to
defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.” Good Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661

522

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:497

wide-ranging investigation”110 under the Commission’s organic statute
that asked, in essence, whether Google had “acted in good faith” toward
its users.111
At other points, Balkin has suggested that the information-fiduciary
model would shelter users from “abusive”112 and “manipulat[ive]”113 corporate behaviors. But depending on how one defines these terms,114
almost all such behaviors may likewise be proscribed by state tort law115
or by state and federal consumer protection statutes, which prohibit “unfair” as well as “deceptive” practices.116 Perhaps, then, the informationfiduciary model is best understood as a restatement or refinement of
consumer protection law, with particular application to online privacy.117
In that case, however, it is fair to ask why we need an abstract new
theorization of the consumer-provider relationship, instead of an institutionally sensitive account of how existing legal norms can be more
effectively elaborated and administered, whether by the FTC or a
European-style data protection agency.118
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
110 Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, at 1 (Jan. 3, 2013) (statement regarding
Google’s search practices), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/
130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2KW-W5BM]; see also id. at 3 n.2.
111 James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 935 (2014). Professor James
Grimmelmann argues that the FTC was right to reject the “search bias” allegations against Google,
but that the Commission should have given more “thought as to how to carry out” the continual
monitoring of Google that it pledged to undertake. Id. at 936.
112 E.g., Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at 2049; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at
1229; see also, e.g., Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1164 (“An information fiduciary
may not betray or abuse the trust of its end-users.”).
113 E.g., Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at
2052, 2053; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1227, 1232.
114 In his most recent piece on the regulation of social media, Balkin defines manipulation as
“techniques of persuasion and influence that (1) prey on another person’s emotional vulnerabilities
and lack of knowledge (2) to benefit oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the welfare of the other
person.” Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 4.
115 See, e.g., Francesca Fontana, Lawsuits Against Facebook over Data Privacy Issues Are Piling
Up, THESTREET (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14536213/1/everyone-who-is-suingfacebook-for-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/829Y-GEL4] (listing privacy-related lawsuits, some of which involve tort claims, filed against Facebook in the wake of the Cambridge
Analytica scandal).
116 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a) (West 2017).
117 Cf. James Grimmelmann, When All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LAW & POL. ECON. (May 30,
2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/30/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary [https://perma.cc/Y762-PPTY]
(suggesting that while fiduciary principles are ill-suited to problems of self-dealing, content moderation, and market concentration on online platforms, the “best version” of U.S. information privacy
law “would cash out fiduciary principles in specifying when and how platforms can use and share
user data”).
118 A number of prominent scholars and advocates have urged the creation of such an agency in
the United States, sometimes pointing to the failures of the FTC at protecting the privacy of online
platform users. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care
Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 66–68 (1997); EPIC to Congress: FTC Has Failed to Protect Privacy, New Data Protection Agency Urgently Needed, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (May 6,
2019), https://epic.org/2019/05/epic-to-congress-ftc-has-faile.html [https://perma.cc/MF9A-S5LJ].
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Balkin’s frequent refrain that digital information fiduciaries would
have to act in “good faith” toward their users119 is telling in what it
leaves out. Again, all parties involved in all contracts, including termsof-service contracts, must always act in good faith toward each other.120
As a matter of law, Balkin’s proposal would change nothing in this regard. What is distinctive about fiduciaries is that they are generally
held to a standard of “utmost” good faith.121 The omission of “utmost”
in Balkin’s narrative supplies further evidence that he does not really
mean to hold online platforms to anything resembling traditional fiduciary obligations, so much as to basic standards of honesty and decency
to which they are already held (however imperfect the enforcement).
This is not to say that every prescription Balkin associates with the
information-fiduciary model would duplicate existing consumer protection or contract law. In particular, he has suggested in recent writing
that digital information fiduciaries would be obligated to vet third
parties before affording them access to user data122 (although not necessarily obligated to obtain users’ consent) and prohibited from encouraging addiction among users.123 If adopted, both suggestions might entail
extra legal responsibilities for online platforms. Yet it is precisely in
these areas where Balkin’s proposal seems to depart from current law
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Other commentators, however, suggest that the FTC may be doing a better job than European data
protection agencies at catalyzing and enforcing consumer privacy norms. See, e.g., Kenneth A.
Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV.
247, 308–11 (2011). For an overview of the FTC’s legal authorities and use of those authorities to
regulate privacy and data security, see generally Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope
and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015).
119 E.g., Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1230; Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra
note 5, at 1161; Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at 2053, 2055; Jack M. Balkin, Mark Zuckerberg
Announces that Facebook Is an Information Fiduciary, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 21, 2018, 8:00 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/mark-zuckerberg-announces-that-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/N2KV-B589].
120 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
121 See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,
458 (1987) (“[A]dmonitions concerning the duty of ‘utmost good faith’ dominat[e] judicial analyses
of fiduciary responsibilities.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Couri v. Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ill.
1983))); David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 890 (2016) (“Fiduciaries
of all sorts are held to a standard of ‘utmost good faith.’”).
122 See, e.g., Balkin, Second Gilded Age, supra note 27, at 1008 (“The duties of care and confidentiality require information fiduciaries to keep data secure and not to disclose it to third parties
unless those third parties are equally trustworthy and agree to the same duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty as the fiduciary.”); see also Dobkin, supra note 105, at 36–43 (proposing similarly
that information-fiduciary duties should prohibit sharing data with third parties under certain circumstances); Theodore Rostow, Note, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data?: A
New Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 700 (2017) (noting that,
under Balkin’s framework, “[t]he responsibilities of information fiduciaries could be expanded to
limit what data companies can sell to brokers”).
123 See, e.g., Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 14 (“[I]f social media companies are
information fiduciaries, they should also have a duty not to use end-user data to addict end
users . . . .”).
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that the tensions become most acute between the fiduciary duties that
he would create and the fiduciary duties that directors owe to shareholders — as an online platform’s bottom line certainly could benefit
from broad data sharing practices and addictive user behaviors. To
break new legal ground here, reformers may have to sacrifice shareholder value to a degree that the information-fiduciary literature has not
yet acknowledged or considered.
B. Enforcement Issues
If Balkin is vague on the substantive legal duties that digital information fiduciaries would owe to users, he is all but silent on how these
new duties would be enforced. He has been similarly silent on what the
remedies for breach would be. These are no small matters given the
number of beneficiaries potentially involved, not to mention the many
respects in which rights, remedies, and their enforcement are “inextricably intertwined.”124
In fiduciary law generally, beneficiaries may enforce their rights in
court125 and remedies “tend to be supracompensatory in order to deter
abuse.”126 Judges in Delaware and beyond are often loath to “wield the
stick” and impose legal liability,127 but across every private law context
of which we are aware, the fiduciary relationship is a juridical relationship overseen by courts. Would the same hold true for the fiduciary
relationship between online platforms and their end users? Or would
some sort of purely internal or administrative complaint process suffice?
If private judicial enforcement is contemplated, the scale of such litigation could be staggering. As of July 2019, Facebook and Google each
had well over 200 million monthly users in the United States alone.128
Given that cases involving newly minted information-fiduciary duties
would likely raise a host of novel legal issues and technical complexities,
Balkin’s proposal has the potential to swallow judicial dockets even
with the aid of class actions, all while further undermining the defendant companies’ ability to serve their shareholder beneficiaries.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
124 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857,
858 (1999).
125 See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145,
1146 (2014) (“Private law labels some relationships of power and dependence between persons ‘fiduciary.’ With the label come duties, enforceable through private rights of action . . . .”).
126 Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 699, 708 (2013).
127 Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public
Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 101 (2013) (“Within the fiduciary field, courts are long on rhetoric
precisely because they rarely wield the stick . . . .”).
128 See Most Popular Multi-platform Web Properties in the United States in July 2019, Based on
Number of Unique Visitors (in Millions), STATISTA (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
271412/most-visited-us-web-properties-based-on-number-of-visitors [https://perma.cc/9G3J-SNPP].
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If, on the other hand, private judicial enforcement is not contemplated, then we have to ask once again whether this is an adaptation or
an abdication of core fiduciary principles. Notably, the Balkin-inspired
legislation introduced by Democratic senators in December 2018 would
treat fiduciary breaches as actionable only by the FTC and, in the
FTC’s absence, state attorneys general.129 Short of direct judicial enforcement, Balkin could alternatively urge courts to enlist fiduciary
principles in an indirect, gap-filling manner when adjudicating contractual, tort, or statutory claims brought against online platforms. Courts
already do a version of this in other contexts.130 Yet while limiting
information-fiduciary duties to indirect enforcement might halt the flood
of lawsuits, it would relegate these duties to a supporting and possibly
marginal legal role, rather than the starring role that advocates seem to
have in mind, as well as to a kind of second-class status within the fiduciary family.
The prospect of judicial enforcement also raises questions about how
individual users or institutional bodies are supposed to know when an
online platform has violated its fiduciary obligations. In recent years,
many of the leading examples of data breaches, privacy invasions, and
other reckless behaviors by social media companies have been uncovered by journalists, with some of the reporting coming close to two years
after the relevant events took place.131 Robust and enterprising investigative journalism would be crucial, it seems, to identifying fiduciary
violations by the dominant online platforms. And yet, the stranglehold
that these same platforms have on the digital advertising market is itself
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
129
130

Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2018).
Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities
Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (1999) (“[T]he common law’s concept of fiduciary duty both
enables and instructs the common law judge to fill in the gaps in an incomplete contract.”); Jonathan
R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (similar); Pozen, supra
note 121, at 890 (noting that principles of good faith may be used by courts “in a ‘gap-filling’ role
to disallow conduct that otherwise would not run afoul of controlling legal texts”).
131 See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, The 21 (and Counting) Biggest Facebook Scandals of 2018, WIRED
(Dec. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-scandals-2018 [https://perma.cc/
9EF8-4KC6]; Emily Stewart, Facebook’s Very Bad Year, Explained, VOX (Dec. 21, 2018, 11:20 AM),
https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/12/21/18149099/delete-facebook-scandals-2018-cambridgeanalytica [https://perma.cc/MUG6-NET8]; Selina Wang, Twitter Sold Data Access to Cambridge
Analytica–Linked Researcher, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2018-04-29/twitter-sold-cambridge-analytica-researcher-public-data-access
[https://perma.cc/48EC-FMJE]. As far as we are aware, the only significant recent revelation about
Facebook not brought to light by journalists occurred when a UK Member of Parliament pressured
an app maker engaged in litigation against Facebook into turning over a cache of internal Facebook
documents about data and privacy controls. See Cyrus Farivar, Six4Three Exec “Panicked” in UK
MP’s Office, Gave Up Facebook Internal Files, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 26, 2018, 7:10 PM), https://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/11/six4three-exec-panicked-in-uk-mps-office-gave-up-facebookinternal-files [https://perma.cc/G9MS-7CL8].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661

526

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:497

one of the biggest threats to the economic viability of such reporting.132
Whether or not any new fiduciary duties are needed, achieving effective
legal enforcement under these conditions may require not just lawsuits
but regular investigations and inspections, along with the imposition of
affirmative duties to disclose data breaches and other compliance failures promptly and publicly.133
C. Problems Unaddressed
The plight of journalism raises a more general issue. If it is unclear
which problems Balkin’s proposal would solve, it seems quite clear that
the information-fiduciary model would leave many profound problems
untouched. This is not the place to offer a detailed inventory, but beyond the issues of privacy and data security that Balkin foregrounds,
the dominant online platforms have been credibly associated with a host
of social ills, from facilitating interference in U.S. elections;134 to serving
as a tool for the incitement of genocide in Myanmar;135 to decreasing
users’ mental and physical health;136 to enabling discrimination and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
132 See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 74, at 506–07; Bell & Owen, supra note 37; Daniel Funke,
What’s Behind the Recent Media Bloodbath? The Dominance of Google and Facebook, POYNTER
(June 14, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2017/whats-behind-the-recent-mediabloodbath-the-dominance-of-google-and-facebook [https://perma.cc/3REK-L4NJ]. From 2008 to
2018, newsroom employment in the United States dropped by twenty-five percent, while newspaper
employment dropped by nearly double as much. See Elizabeth Grieco, U.S. Newsroom Employment Has Dropped by a Quarter Since 2008, with Greatest Decline at Newspapers, PEW RES. CTR.
(July 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/09/u-s-newsroom-employment-hasdropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008 [https://perma.cc/G66K-JB3R]. Facebook also impedes investigative journalism more directly through its terms of service, which ban reporters and researchers from
using automated collection techniques or temporary research accounts to study the platform. See
Alex Abdo, Opinion, Facebook Is Shaping Public Discourse. We Need to Understand How, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/15/
facebook-twitter-social-media-public-discourse [https://perma.cc/H4H3-D78U].
133 The European Union’s major privacy law, the GDPR, requires that covered firms notify the
relevant authorities of any data breach within seventy-two hours of having become aware of it.
Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 52.
134 See, e.g., Nancy Scola, Massive Twitter Data Release Sheds Light on Russia’s Trump Strategy,
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/17/twitter-foreigninfluence-operations-910005 [https://perma.cc/5GLB-8LET] (“Twitter and Facebook have been
widely criticized since the 2016 election for not doing more to stem the abuse of their platforms by
Russians and other foreign actors hoping to manipulate the American political landscape.”).
135 See, e.g., Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2QToYQA [https://perma.cc/94LU-3NLA] (describing
“a systematic campaign on Facebook” by members of the Myanmar military to incite violence
against the country’s Rohingya minority group).
136 See, e.g., Holly B. Shakya & Nicholas A. Christakis, A New, More Rigorous Study Confirms:
The More You Use Facebook, the Worse You Feel, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/04/a-new-more-rigorous-study-confirms-the-more-you-use-facebook-the-worseyou-feel [https://perma.cc/TS9T-ZK5D] (“[M]ost measures of Facebook use in one year predicted a
decrease in mental health in a later year. We found consistently that both liking others’ content
and clicking links significantly predicted a subsequent reduction in self-reported physical health,
mental health, and life satisfaction.”). See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 74, at 461–65 (reviewing
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harassment against women and racial minorities;137 to amplifying the
influence of “fake news,” conspiracy theories, bot-generated propaganda,138 and inflammatory and divisive content more broadly.139 Betrayal of users’ trust as to how their data will be handled is just one
category of concerns raised by these companies, and not necessarily the
most worrisome category.
Many of the broader harms associated with these platforms are magnified or made possible by a behavioral-advertising-based business
model coupled with outsized market share. While these are distinct features — a company could have the business model without the market
position, and vice versa — the problems they create tend to be mutually
reinforcing. For example, in recent years Google and Facebook together
have captured roughly three-quarters of all digital advertising sales in
the United States and an even higher percentage of growth.140 Their
control over digital advertising networks appears to be an important
factor behind the past decade’s consolidation within the publishing industry and tens of thousands of layoffs at newspapers and magazines.141
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
a “growing body of evidence [that] testifies to the psychic toll of life in the hive” of social media, id.
at 461, especially for younger users).
137 See, e.g., OLIVIER SYLVAIN, EMERGING THREATS: DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON
USER DATA 3, 8–16 (David Pozen ed., 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/
28a74f6e98/Discriminatory-Designs-on-User-Data.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QMN-WAAX] (discussing such discrimination and harassment and linking them to design features of online intermediaries).
138 See, e.g., TIM WU, EMERGING THREATS: IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT OBSOLETE? 11–
17 (David Pozen ed., 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/5d8a0f848d/Isthe-First-Amendment-Obsolete-.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHR5-CVCZ] (discussing the proliferation
of “fake news,” id. at 15, 16, 17, “junk news,” id. at 16 (quoting PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL.,
PROJECT ON COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA, JUNK NEWS AND BOTS DURING THE U.S.
ELECTION: WHAT WERE MICHIGAN VOTERS SHARING OVER TWITTER? 1 (2017), http://
comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/03/What-Were-Michigan-Voters-Sharing-OverTwitter-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ85-FTMA]), “abusive online mobs,” id. at 11, “reverse
censorship,” id. at 11, 15, and “bots,” id. at 15, 16, on leading digital platforms).
139 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
140 See Alex Heath, Facebook and Google Completely Dominate the Digital Ad Industry, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 26, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-and-google-dominatead-industry-with-a-combined-99-of-growth-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/4NM4-L8SN].
141 Commentary on this subject is copious. See supra note 132; see also, e.g., Josh Constine, How
Facebook Stole the News Business, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 3, 2018, 12:10 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/03/facebooks-siren-call
[https://perma.cc/3YRJ-RY2U];
Roy
Greenslade, Why Facebook Is Public Enemy Number One for Newspapers, and Journalism, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:54 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/sep/
20/why-facebook-is-public-enemy-number-one-for-newspapers-and-journalism [https://perma.cc/
E7XB-Y3WD]; Michael Miller, Opinion, Google Is Not Journalism’s Friend and Now It’s Trying to
Undermine Paywalls, FIN. REV. (May 31, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.afr.com/opinion/google-isnot-journalisms-friend-and-now-its-trying-to-undermine-paywalls-20170530-gwghgp
[https://
perma.cc/YM3Z-P9L4]. In Farhad Manjoo’s pithy formulation, “[t]he cause of each [media] company’s troubles may be distinct, but collectively the blood bath points to the same underlying market pathology: the inability of the digital advertising business to make much meaningful room for
anyone but monopolistic tech giants.” Farhad Manjoo, Opinion, Why the Latest Layoffs Are
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As the professional media has shrunk, more and more local communities
have been left with little to no meaningful news coverage.142 On multiple interacting levels that transcend any given user’s experience, the behaviors of a few platforms have been affecting the fabric and functioning
of our democracy — often for the worse.
Against this backdrop of platform dominance and democratic decay,
the user-centric nature of the information-fiduciary proposal should give
pause. The relevant inquiry for legal reformers, we submit, should be
not just how a firm such as Google or Facebook exercises its power over
end users, but whether it ought to enjoy that kind of power in the first
place. Limiting the dominance of some of these firms may well have
salutary effects for consumer privacy, both by facilitating competition
on privacy protection and by reducing the likelihood that any single
data-security failure will cascade into a much wider harm.143 More than
that, the very effort to think through the ramifications of platform power
would force policymakers to grapple with a wide range of systemic concerns that fall outside the fiduciary frame.
To be clear, we do not believe that addressing the market clout of
companies like Facebook will remedy the full panoply of harms associated with them. Nor do we view antitrust enforcement as the sole tool
for addressing this dominance. Our point here (which we will develop
further in section IV.B) is that any broad regulatory framework or
“grand bargain”144 for social media that focuses on abusive data practices, without attending to issues of market structure or politicaleconomic influence, is bound to be at best highly incomplete and at
worst an impediment to necessary reforms.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Devastating to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2GgrPke
[https://perma.cc/TGY5-4YS8].
142 See, e.g., Yemile Bucay, Vittoria Elliott, Jennie Kamin & Andrea Park, America’s Growing
News Deserts, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Spring 2017), https://www.cjr.org/local_news/americannews-deserts-donuts-local.php [https://perma.cc/CKL7-MSMP]; Riley Griffin, Local News Is Dying,
and It’s Taking Small Town America with It, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:02 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-05/local-news-is-dying-and-it-s-taking-small-townamerica-with-it [https://perma.cc/Y6VJ-2BJ5].
143 For example, one of the biggest data breaches that Facebook suffered in 2018 derived from
the site serving as a central passport to the internet, such that one’s Facebook login can serve as a
credential for numerous third-party sales. Once hackers stole the single access key, they won access
to users’ non-Facebook logins as well. See Issie Lapowsky, The Facebook Hack Exposes an InternetWide Failure, WIRED (Oct. 2, 2018, 10:12 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-hacksingle-sign-on-data-exposed [https://perma.cc/N53B-PJW5]. The primary problem here was not
necessarily insufficient protection on Facebook’s part, so much as the structurally central role that
the company plays in the digital realm. On the general relationship between market structure and
the capacity to absorb unexpected shocks, see BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 78–83 (2010); and Peter C.
Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the Importance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783, 787–89, 826–45.
144 Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5; see supra p. 509.
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IV. WITH WHAT BENEFITS AND COSTS?
We have argued that the information-fiduciary proposal could cure
at most a small fraction of the problems associated with online platforms — and to the extent it does, only by undercutting directors’ duties
to shareholders, undermining foundational principles of fiduciary law,
or both. Why, then, has the idea proven so popular?
At a theoretical level, Balkin’s proposal is consilient as well as creative; it seems to resolve a tangle of thorny issues with a single, timeworn
legal concept. The failure to specify institutional or operational details
can thus be held out as a feature, not a bug.145 At a political level, the
proposal comes across as consumer protective yet conflict suppressive,
promising to deliver broad social benefits without overly threatening the
tech giants or their profits. At an aesthetic level, there is something
attractive about the way in which a fiduciary framework would hold
platforms to their own rhetoric of trustworthiness. In other areas of law,
too, a number of legal scholars have been pressing in recent years for
increasingly expansive accounts of fiduciary obligation.146 Perhaps the
very idea of recasting powerful institutions as duty-bound, other-regarding
agents, as if they “operate outside the capitalist free-for-all of exchange
relations,”147 has become more alluring in an age of widespread anxiety
about the state of capitalism and liberal democracy.
Whatever the sources of its appeal (and there may be different
sources for different audiences), the biggest legal benefit of Balkin’s proposal, on his telling, is that a fiduciary framework would allow regulations enacted in its name to withstand First Amendment challenges that
might otherwise be fatal.148 Meanwhile, Balkin has clarified that his
proposal is not meant to be a cure-all and could be complemented with
other reforms, including “pro-competition rules or increased antitrust
enforcement.”149 The implication is that there is no basis for worrying
that the proposal does not accomplish enough on its own.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
145 See, e.g., Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 15 (“The fiduciary approach has many
advantages. It is not tied to any particular technology. It can adapt to technological change. It can be
implemented at the state or the federal level, and by judges, legislatures, or administrative agencies.”).
146 See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Keeping the Promise of Public Fiduciary Theory:
A Reply to Leib and Galoob, 126 YALE L.J.F. 192, 193 (2016) (discussing the recent “revival of public
fiduciary theory”); Grimmelmann, supra note 111, at 904 (“[W]e are undergoing something of an
academic fiduciary renaissance, with scholars arguing for treating legislators, judges, jurors, and
even friends as fiduciaries.” (citations omitted)); Daniel Yeager, Fiduciary-isms: A Study of
Academic Influence on the Expansion of the Law, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 179, 184 (2017) (describing
“how academic writing, deploying a sense of fiduciary so open as to be empty, has influenced courts
to designate” an ever-expanding set of actors as fiduciaries).
147 Yeager, supra note 146, at 183 (“Fiduciaries are said to operate outside the capitalist free-forall of exchange relations . . . .”).
148 This is a central theme of Balkin’s first, and still most extensive, academic statement of the
proposal. See Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1209–20.
149 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 15.
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Both of these arguments are tantalizing. But both, in our view, are
seriously flawed. We see little constitutional upside to the informationfiduciary proposal and significant policy downside. Let us consider each
issue in turn.
A. The False Promise of First Amendment Flexibility
The First Amendment, Balkin observes, “may be a potential obstacle
to laws that try to regulate private infrastructure owners in order to
protect end-users’ freedom of speech and privacy.”150 For example,
broadband companies have challenged network neutrality regulations
(unsuccessfully to date) as a violation of their corporate free speech
rights.151 And social media companies might challenge new measures
“restricting how they use, distribute, or sell the consumer data that they
collect” on the ground that this data is their “speech or knowledge.”152
First Amendment law, at least in its current “Lochnerian” form,153
works almost exclusively to the advantage of the online platforms.
“Instead of empowering users to challenge their policies, the First
Amendment empowers the companies themselves to challenge statutes
and regulations intended to promote antidiscrimination norms or users’
speech and privacy, among other values.”154
If these companies were to be recognized as fiduciaries for their
users, however, Balkin argues that the constitutional calculus would tip
in the regulator’s favor. He maintains that because the speech that
occurs in fiduciary settings concerns special services rendered in the context of special relationships of vulnerability and dependency, the “First
Amendment treats information practices by fiduciaries very differently
than it treats information practices involving relative strangers.”155
“Generally speaking, when the law prevents a fiduciary from disclosing
or selling information about a client — or using information to a client’s
disadvantage — this does not violate the First Amendment, even though
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
150
151

Balkin, Second Gilded Age, supra note 27, at 982.
See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740–44 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a 2015 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order imposing common carrier obligations on telecommunications companies). But cf. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
855 F.3d 381, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
(arguing that the FCC order is unconstitutional because “the First Amendment bars the Government
from restricting the editorial discretion of Internet service providers, absent a showing that an Internet service provider possesses market power in a relevant geographic market”).
152 Balkin, Second Gilded Age, supra note 27, at 982.
153 See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Introduction, The Search for an Egalitarian First
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1959–64 (2018) (reviewing the contemporary debate over
“First Amendment Lochnerism,” id. at 1962). Roughly speaking, First Amendment Lochnerism
refers to “a First Amendment jurisprudence that disables redistributive regulation and exacerbates
socioeconomic inequality.” Id. at 2007.
154 Id. at 1973.
155 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1209.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661

2019]

A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES

531

the activity would be protected if there were no fiduciary relationship.”156 In support of this claim, Balkin cites four state court cases,
three from the 1970s and one from the 1990s, recognizing a doctor’s duty
not to disclose patient information.157 He also interprets a 1985 securities law case that was decided by the Supreme Court on statutory
grounds, Lowe v. SEC,158 as signaling that “ordinary First Amendment
doctrine — including even the ban on prior restraints — would not apply to communications” between certain professional fiduciaries and
their beneficiaries.159
Balkin’s argument here is elegant and insightful, but it does not
appear to track the approach that the Roberts Court would actually
employ when evaluating First Amendment claims brought by online
platforms that had been designated as fiduciaries for their users
(whether by Congress, an administrative agency, or the Court itself).
Last year, in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v.
Becerra,160 Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court was emphatic that
the Court has never “recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech.”161 Nor did the Court see any “persuasive reason” to
reconsider that stance now.162 There is good reason to think that Justice
Thomas overstated this point and that certain narrow categories of professional speech, such as doctors’ advice to patients, will continue to be
treated differently from other categories of speech (or treated as nonspeech) under the First Amendment, unless the Court wishes to wreak
havoc on longstanding regimes of professional licensing, informed consent, and malpractice liability.163 But at a minimum, National Institute
of Family & Life Advocates signals skepticism about Balkin’s broader
claim that “the law does not treat speech in professional or other fiduciary relationships as part of public discourse” and instead treats such
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156
157
158
159

Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1210 n.120.
472 U.S. 181 (1985).
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1219. Balkin maintains that “most professional relationships are fiduciary relationships.” Id. at 1209.
160 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
161 Id. at 2371; see also id. at 2371–72 (“Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by
‘professionals.’”). Justice Thomas added that the Court “has been especially reluctant to ‘exemp[t]
a category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions.’” Id. at 2372 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
In her largely sympathetic 2016 response to Balkin, Bambauer anticipated a version of this rejoinder. See Bambauer, supra note 8, at 1950 (“[A]ny attempt to harness the power of fiduciary relationships in order to achieve broad privacy policy runs into an unavoidable problem: it violates the
cardinal rule of content-neutrality.”).
162 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
163 See Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 188 (2018)
(arguing forcefully that “despite the [National Institute of Family & Life Advocates] Court’s insistence that it has never recognized professional speech as a category,” professional speech — when
“narrowly defined” — is and should remain “a type of speech doctrinally distinct from others”).
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speech “as part of ordinary social and economic activity that is subject
to reasonable regulation.”164
Even if the Court were to affirm some sort of relaxed standard of First
Amendment review for regulations of traditional fiduciary-beneficiary
communications, it is not at all clear that the Court would apply this
standard to the special case of digital information fiduciaries. Justice
White’s concurring opinion in Lowe, which was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, suggested that regulations of a profession
should be given more lenient First Amendment treatment only when
there is a “personal nexus between professional and client” and the professional is “exercising judgment on behalf of [a] particular individual
with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted.”165 A “personal
nexus” of this sort is arguably lacking altogether in the context of online
platforms.166 Moreover, Balkin’s crucial concession that the fiduciary
duties owed by online platforms to their users will be “more limited”167
than the duties of traditional fiduciaries leads naturally to the possibility
that the government’s regulatory leeway may be more limited as well.
Balkin is at pains to emphasize that fiduciary relationships are not
one-size-fits-all in the law;168 why, then, should we assume that First
Amendment review of these heterogeneous relationships will always
take the same form?
In short, the notion that designating online platforms as fiduciaries
would yield a significant First Amendment payoff strikes us as resting
on an overly simple (if not nominalist) view of how judges would respond to such a designation, and as contradicted by the Roberts Court’s
case law. Balkin’s argument here, in any event, extends only to regulations that could be characterized as speech regulations — most notably,
restrictions on what platforms can do with the consumer data they
gather. It is inapplicable to other policy tools that could not plausibly
be characterized as speech regulations even by proponents of the “data
is speech” view,169 including most antitrust and procompetition tools;
public certification or safe harbor programs “in which companies opt
into various promises (backed by regulatory enforcement) in exchange

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
164
165
166
167
168
169

Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1217.
Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result).
See supra sections II.B–C, pp. 510–19.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See generally Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014). For a contrary
perspective, see, for example, Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1169 (2005) (“I believe that most privacy regulation that interrupts information
flows in the context of an express or implied commercial relationship is neither ‘speech’ within the
current meaning of the First Amendment, nor should it be viewed as such.” (footnotes omitted)).
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for” certain legal or reputational benefits;170 requirements that firms pay
people for their data;171 data portability and interoperability mandates;172 co-regulation schemes that incentivize businesses to continually
produce and share compliance information;173 and any number of frontend limits or “taxes” on private data collection.174 Especially given the
extraterritorial reach of the GDPR’s personal data protections,175 these
sorts of policy tools may have more bite at this time than the regulations
Balkin has in mind.
Furthermore, within the domain where it does apply, we question
whether Balkin’s argument makes the strongest case for the constitutionality of public-interested platform regulation. Balkin grounds his
argument in the special nature of the relationships that digital information fiduciaries, like all other fiduciaries, purportedly have with their
beneficiaries. First Amendment theory, however, supplies numerous
other possible grounds for justifying regulations meant to enhance platform users’ privacy, security, and control of their own data — from arguments that commercial speech and computer algorithms deserve only
modest, if any, constitutional protection;176 to the contention that online
service providers should be treated as public trustees177 or public utilities;178 to “systemic” perspectives on free speech that read the First
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
170 Bambauer, supra note 8, at 1952. Information-fiduciary principles might themselves be instituted through a safe-harbor program, see Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5, but so presumably could
other, more concrete legal obligations related to the goals of the program.
171 See, e.g., Data Workers of the World, Unite, THE ECONOMIST (July 7, 2018), https://www.
economist.com/the-world-if/2018/07/07/data-workers-of-the-world-unite [https://perma.cc/W8L2BVVQ]; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Want Our Personal Data? Pay for It, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
20, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-our-personal-data-pay-for-it-1524237577
[https://perma.cc/W8N5-FDN4].
172 See, e.g., Bennett Cyphers & Danny O’Brien, Facing Facebook: Data Portability and Interoperability Are Anti-Monopoly Medicine, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 24, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/07/facing-facebook-data-portability-and-interoperability-areanti-monopoly-medicine [https://perma.cc/Z22M-7ZE8] (suggesting that the FTC could impose
such mandates on Facebook as “part of an antitrust remedy or negotiated settlement”).
173 See, e.g., Dani Rodrik & Charles Sabel, Building a Good Jobs Economy 9 (Apr. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Law School Library).
174 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution 6–7, 33–44 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 679, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191231 [https://perma.cc/95WW-H4G3]
(contrasting data “taxes,” id. at 6, with “command-and-control” limits, id. at 33).
175 See ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES
THE WORLD 143 (forthcoming 2020) (on file with Harvard Law School Library) (discussing the
GDPR’s broad extraterritorial reach and “the extent to which [global companies] are choosing to
adopt EU privacy policy as their company standard”); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot &
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What
It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 98 (2019) (providing an overview of the
GDPR and the ways in which it “will influence [privacy] policy worldwide”).
176 See Kessler & Pozen, supra note 153, at 1988 nn.164–65 (collecting sources to this effect).
177 WU, supra note 138, at 23.
178 Rahman, supra note 88, at 1668–80.
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Amendment as permitting or even requiring the government to take affirmative measures “to engineer a fairer, fuller, ‘freer’ expressive environment for everyone.”179
We are not suggesting that these theories are without serious problems of their own, much less that the Roberts Court is likely to embrace
any of them. But neither is the Court likely to embrace Balkin’s approach.180 And whatever their defects, these other theories at least focus
attention on the most constitutionally salient feature of companies like
Google and Facebook: not that their end users must be able to trust and
depend on them, but that they are extraordinarily powerful actors with
the potential to do great harm to (as well as good for) the freedoms of
speech, assembly, and the press. Put more sharply, a First Amendment
jurisprudence that analogizes the dominant online firms to doctors and
lawyers, while ignoring their status as increasingly essential platforms
for mass communication and the “New Governors” of the public
sphere,181 is not credible. It obscures the real social stakes.
B. Downside Risks
Against this highly speculative and very possibly nonexistent First
Amendment upside, a full analysis of the information-fiduciary proposal
also needs to consider its potential downsides. We see several significant
ones. As with the critical legal and conceptual points raised in Parts II
and III, we have not encountered any discussion of these policy risks in
the growing literature on the subject.
First, and most simply, a fiduciary framework paints a false portrait
of the digital world. It characterizes Facebook, Google, Twitter, and
other online platforms as fundamentally trustworthy actors who put
their users’ interests first. As we tried to show in Part II, this is not a
plausible depiction of what most of these companies — even if chastened
in the ways Balkin outlines — are really like. The tension between what
it would take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on the
one hand, and these companies’ economic incentives and duties to shareholders, on the other, is too deep to resolve without fundamental reform.
To suggest otherwise is to risk mystification of “surveillance capitalism,”182 entrenchment of prevailing business models, and legitimation of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
179
180
181
182

Kessler & Pozen, supra note 153, at 2002.
See supra notes 161–168 and accompanying text.
Klonick, supra note 89, at 1663.
ZUBOFF, supra note 74; cf. Kessler & Pozen, supra note 153, at 1971–73 (reviewing the critical
literature on “informational capitalism” and “communicative capitalism,” id. at 1972 (first quoting
Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
369, 371 (2016); and then quoting JODI DEAN, DEMOCRACY AND OTHER NEOLIBERAL
FANTASIES: COMMUNICATIVE CAPITALISM AND LEFT POLITICS (2009))).
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a wide range of troubling practices, if not also the unraveling of fiduciary law itself.183
Second, this false portrait of reality invites policy misfires. To a large
extent, it seems that Balkin’s prescriptions would simply mirror or marginally refine longstanding consumer protection guarantees and antifraud doctrines,184 in which case our time and energy may be better
spent figuring out how to strengthen enforcement of the existing rules
rather than proliferating legal categories.185 Meanwhile, to the degree
that Balkin’s prescriptions depart from existing consumer protection
law,186 his theory lacks the resources to justify prioritizing those departures over countless other moves that might be made. The “grand bargain organized around the idea of fiduciary responsibility” that Balkin
and Zittrain have put forward,187 in which a new federal statute would
preempt state laws about online privacy, strikes us as an especially bad
deal for proponents of online privacy, given the watered-down version
of fiduciary responsibility such a statute would codify and the “pioneer[ing]” role that state attorneys general have played in enforcing their
own unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices laws.188
Third, the information-fiduciary proposal conceives of systemic
problems in relational terms. The reason a company like Facebook can
and should be regulated in a special way, it tells us, is that Facebook has
(or should have) a special relationship of trust and dependency with each
of its users. Not only does this argument ignore how Facebook generates
dependency,189 but it also recasts what ought to be questions of the public interest — questions about what kind of social media landscape is
good for our democracy — in a narrow quasi-contractarian frame that
asks, instead, what Facebook owes any given individual who signs up
for its service. This framing implicitly downgrades other accounts of
the appropriate bases for government intervention and other models of
public regulation, in particular those that conceptualize privacy as
a public good190 or that aim to ward off extreme asymmetries
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
183 Even if “the law of fiduciary obligation has developed through analogy to contexts in which
the obligation conventionally applies,” Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879, presumably some analogies would be so strained
as to degrade rather than coherently advance this developmental process.
184 See supra notes 104–121 and accompanying text.
185 For a recent argument that the FTC’s ability to protect consumer privacy has been “severely
curtailed” by the Commission’s lack of general rulemaking authority, its reluctance to target unfair
practices as distinct from deceptive practices, and inadequate funding levels, among other factors,
see Barrett, supra note 20, at 1073–78.
186 See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
187 Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5; see supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
188 Citron, supra note 107, at 750, 785, 800, 811.
189 See supra section II.C, pp. 516–19.
190 On the ways in which digital privacy can be seen as a public good, see generally Joshua A.T.
Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385 (2015); Zeynep Tufekci,
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of knowledge and power or “structural stranglehold[s] over digital
media.”191 By the same token, the information-fiduciary proposal
implicitly acquiesces in the legal decisions that enabled certain online
platforms to become so dominant. It takes current market structures as
a given.
Recently, Balkin has suggested that a fiduciary approach to regulating online platforms can be combined with more ambitious approaches,
in effect giving us the best of both worlds.192 “The fiduciary approach,”
Balkin writes, “meshes well with other forms of consumer protection”
and, “[i]n particular, it does not get in the way of new pro-competition
rules or increased antitrust enforcement.”193 These policy tools would
potentially “restructure how digital advertising operates”194 and “break
up the largest companies into smaller companies that can compete with
each other or create a space for new competitors to emerge.”195 Balkin’s
interest in such tools resonates with and responds to a growing body of
neo-Progressive scholarship that urges greater emphasis on structural
(or infrastructural) solutions to problems of discrimination and domination online.196
While we commend Balkin’s turn toward structural analysis of this
sort, we are deeply skeptical of the claim that the fiduciary approach
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Opinion, The Latest Data Privacy Debacle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Guv05G
[https://perma.cc/BE8W-QARK]; and Ben-Shahar, supra note 174, at 10–16.
191 David Pozen, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Facebookland, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 30,
2018, 12:14 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/authoritarian-constitutionalism-in.html
[https://perma.cc/KG6A-2LU7].
192 This suggestion is echoed in Barrett, supra note 20, at 1107–12; and Grimmelmann, supra
note 117.
193 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 15.
194 Id. at 10–11.
195 Id. at 11. Traditional antimonopoly and procompetition remedies include horizontal and vertical breakups, interoperability and portability regimes, and common carriage requirements. For a
taxonomy of “competition catalysts” used by agencies like the FTC and FCC, see Tim Wu, Antitrust
via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 33, 47–61 (2017). For discussions of
how some of these remedies might be applied to digital platforms like Facebook, see TIM WU, THE
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 133 (2018) (“The simplest way to
break the power of Facebook is breaking up Facebook.”); Barry Lynn & Matt Stoller, Opinion,
Facebook Must Be Restructured. The FTC Should Take These Nine Steps Now, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 22, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/22/restructurefacebook-ftc-regulate-9-steps-now [https://perma.cc/H8DB-KCB5] (proposing a series of reforms
for Facebook, including a spinoff of its advertising network, divestiture of WhatsApp and Instagram,
and limits on future acquisitions); and Luigi Zingales & Guy Rolnik, Opinion, A Way to Own Your
Social-Media Data, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2tvfnHc [https://perma.cc/V7DKT9L9] (advocating a data-portability regime that would reduce the cost of switching social networks
and likely generate greater competition).
196 See generally, e.g., Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 973 (2019); Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009
(2013); Rahman, supra note 88; K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234 (2018); Gigi Sohn, A Policy
Framework for an Open Internet Ecosystem, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 335 (2018).
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“meshes well” with it. On the contrary, we suspect that the fiduciary
approach, if pursued with any real vigor, would tend to cannibalize rather than complement procompetition reforms. This fourth and final
downside risk may be the most practically consequential of them all.
When introducing the information-fiduciary proposal, Balkin and
Zittrain billed it as a kind of regulatory third way that could transcend
ordinary political divides and policy tradeoffs. Highlighting the
proposal’s “bipartisan appeal,” Zittrain explained that it “protects consumers and corrects a clear market failure without the need for heavyhanded government intervention.”197 Elsewhere, he suggested that a
fiduciary approach might “nudge” companies like Facebook to “do the
right thing,” “without outright requiring it.”198 The details were fuzzy
but the message was clear. A fiduciary approach would promote users’
interests without necessarily causing too much trouble for the online
platforms or their business models, thereby allowing Balkin and Zittrain
to win wide support while sidestepping contentious questions like
whether to restructure or break up Facebook, a step for which a number
of commentators have called.199 The basic selling point of the fiduciary
approach was that it would be flexible, light-touch, un-“heavyhanded” — in contrast to and in lieu of structural reforms.
Balkin and Zittrain’s early advocacy traded on an insight that remains as valid today as it was then: lawmakers can regulate the leading
online platforms as information fiduciaries or target their market dominance and business models, but lawmakers very likely will not do both.
To assume otherwise is to overlook the opportunity costs, path dependencies, and expressive effects inherent in creating a new fiduciary regime. Mark Zuckerberg seems to grasp this. He is presumably attracted
to the information-fiduciary proposal not just because of its “thoughtful[ness]”200 and “intuitive[ness]”201 but also because of its political implications. An entity that is designated by the government as a loyal
caretaker for the personal data of millions of Americans is not an entity
that is liable to be dismantled by that same government. Facebook-asfiduciary is no longer a public problem to be solved, potentially through
radical reform. It is a nexus of sensitive private relationships to be managed, nurtured, and sustained.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
197
198
199

Zittrain, How to Exercise, supra note 5.
Zittrain, Fix This Mess, supra note 5.
See, e.g., ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE
263 (2019); WU, supra note 195, at 132–33; Lynn & Stoller, supra note 195; Sarah Miller & David
Segal, Opinion, Break Up Facebook: Latest Hack Proves It’s a Dangerous Monopoly that a Fine
Won’t Fix, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2018, 12:55 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/
2018/10/05/facebook-dangerous-monopoly-divest-instagram-whatsapp-messenger-column/
1512215002 [https://perma.cc/CHG3-KX8R].
200 Brandom, supra note 9 (quoting Zuckerberg).
201 Zittrain and Zuckerberg, supra note 12 (quoting Zuckerberg).
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V. ALTERNATIVE ANALOGIES
This Article is an exercise in critique, not prescription. We have
interrogated the increasingly popular analogy between online platforms
and their end users, on the one hand, and professional fiduciaries and
their patients and clients, on the other, and we have found this analogy
inapposite on multiple levels. Analogical reasoning can retard rather
than advance the cause of legal reform when it elides important institutional differences or normative considerations.202 Although we do not
elaborate any reform program of our own in this Article, we will close by
noting two analogies that strike us as more felicitous starting points than
traditional fiduciary relationships for the project of platform regulation.
First, in the case of Facebook, Google, and other large online platforms, we might draw an analogy to “offline” providers of social and
economic infrastructure.203 To the degree that these platforms serve as
key channels of communication, commerce, and information flow, they
can be recognized as controlling the terms of access to essential services.
In the Progressive Era, policymakers feared that concentrated private
control over infrastructure would create an intolerable imbalance of
power between a small number of firms and the communities, businesses, and individuals dependent on them.204 Regulatory interventions
were therefore focused on directly disciplining this power through a
combination of legal tools, including nondiscrimination and common
carrier regimes, limits on the lines of business in which firms could engage, interoperability requirements, corporate governance reforms, and
public options.205
The same regulatory principles deserve close consideration today. To
the extent that Facebook and Google have achieved their dominance
through anticompetitive means, antitrust lawsuits reversing key acqui-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
202 For a valuable argument to this effect, focused on the analogy that some have drawn between
digital media companies and traditional news publishers, see generally WHITNEY, supra note 3.
203 We have already previewed this analogy. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; supra
note 196 and accompanying text.
204 See Rahman, supra note 88, at 1628–39. Professor K. Sabeel Rahman defines infrastructure
as “those goods and services which (i) have scale effects in their production or provision . . . ; (ii)
unlock and enable a wide variety of downstream economic and social activities . . . ; and (iii) place
users in a position of potential subordination, exploitation, or vulnerability if their access . . . is
curtailed in some way.” Id. at 1644.
205 See id. at 1645–47; see also Khan, supra note 196, at 1037–52 (providing an overview of “separations regimes,” id. at 1037, applied throughout the twentieth century to proscribe certain organizational structures for railroads, bank holding companies, television networks, and telecommunication carriers); cf. GANESH SITARAMAN & ANNE L. ALSTOTT, THE PUBLIC OPTION: HOW TO
EXPAND FREEDOM, INCREASE OPPORTUNITY, AND PROMOTE EQUALITY (2019) (describing
and defending “public option[s]” that offer people a choice between governmental and private provision of a good or service).
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sitions and penalizing forms of monopoly leveraging might play a complementary role by opening up both primary and adjacent markets.206
Importantly, however, “structural” interventions do not necessarily have
to break up firms. They can also reshape business incentives through
bright-line prohibitions on specific modes of earning revenue, and they
can reshape markets by creating the conditions for greater competition
and consumer autonomy.207 Data interoperability requirements, for example, allow users to move their data across platforms, which in turn
requires incumbent services to continuously compete.208 With such requirements in place, a platform that perennially violated users’ privacy
would likely lose ground to more privacy-conscious rivals, instead of
benefiting from high switching costs that keep users trapped within unhealthy environments.209
Second, in thinking about the regulatory challenges posed by digital
platforms’ collection, aggregation, and use of personal data, we might
draw an analogy to environmental pollution. Professor Omri BenShahar has recently proposed this analogy as a way to move beyond the
privacy paradigm in addressing the social harms of these practices —
not just the concerns they may raise for any given individual subject to
surveillance but also the negative externalities they may cause for third
parties and for public interests more generally.210 A pollution perspective helps to highlight why private law solutions are inadequate to the
nature of the threat.211
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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207

Versions of this argument are made in the sources cited supra note 199.
See K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 117–18 (2016) (distinguishing “structuralist” regulatory strategies, which “limit the underlying powers and capacities” of
certain firms, from “managerialist” approaches that rely on “fine-tuning expert management,” id. at
118); Wu, supra note 195, at 34–35 (cataloging a range of “industry-specific statutes, rulemakings,
[and] other tools of the regulatory state to achieve the traditional competition goals associated with
the antitrust laws,” id. at 34).
208 Interoperability is thus what Professor Tim Wu calls a “switching cost reducer[].” Wu, supra
note 195, at 35, 56; see also id. at 56–57 (“Switching costs are a barrier to competition because they
require that a competitor not just be slightly better, but quite a bit better to compensate for the
costs incurred in changing providers.”).
209 Cf. supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (suggesting that Facebook currently benefits
from high switching costs of this sort).
210 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 174. Other scholars have drawn similar environmental analogies.
See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1742–45; Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting
the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L.
REV. 1, 23–30 (2006); Ian Samuel, The New Writs of Assistance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2914–
24 (2018).
211 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 174, at 16–31. Like all analogies, this one is imperfect even if
illuminating. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Personal Data as an Environmental Hazard, JOTWELL
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://torts.jotwell.com/personal-data-as-an-environmental-hazard [https://perma.
cc/L88N-XD93] (noting that, unlike air pollution, “data pollution does not only create negative
externalities, it also creates positive externalities”).
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The pollution analogy points away from individualistic, consumercentric frameworks and toward a different set of techniques for reducing
surveillance-related harms: namely, ex ante prohibitions on which sorts
of data can be gathered and to what extent; Pigouvian taxes on data
collection and retention that force firms to internalize their social costs;
and ex post liability rules for data “spills” and other data disasters that
facilitate deterrence and compensation.212 We take no stance here as to
the optimal design of or balance among these techniques. We do, however, endorse the implicit insight that the harms from digital surveillance
must be met with clear prohibitions and economic disincentives, rather
than morally laden standards.
A fiduciary approach that targets “con artist[ry]”213 invites the dominant platforms to shun a small set of behaviors and then claim the
mantle of trustworthiness, both narrowing the scope of public debate
and normalizing the basic operations of surveillance capitalism.214
Without inviting these responses, outright limits or harsh penalties on
certain forms of data collection and retention could help to detoxify the
larger online ecosystem while preventing platforms from conditioning
access to essential services on the ever-greater surrendering of personal
data. The German competition authority recently provided an example
of such an approach when it ruled that “Facebook will no longer
be allowed to force its users to agree to the practically unrestricted collection and assigning of non-Facebook data [culled from thirdparty sources] to their Facebook user accounts.”215 The upshot, the
Bundeskartellamt’s president said, will be a “divestiture” of data216 — or,
in other words, less power for Facebook and less pollution for everyone.
CONCLUSION
Figuring out how to regulate digital firms such as Facebook, Google,
and Twitter is one of the central challenges of the “Second Gilded
Age,”217 and Balkin deserves credit for moving the conversation forward. His information-fiduciary proposal, however, is also moving the
conversation backward — redirecting attention away from all of the
problems associated with high levels of market concentration, away
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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213
214

Ben-Shahar, supra note 174, at 7; see id. at 6–7.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text; supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Cf. Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, 61 B.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 41), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441502 [https://perma.cc/9P2K3C6L] (arguing that “data protection” regimes, including the GDPR, “advance fair processing rules
at the same time as they condition us to a world and society in [which] data processing is inevitable
and inevitably good”).
215 Bundeskartellamt Press Release, supra note 97, at 1–2 (emphasis added).
216 Id. at 1.
217 See Balkin, Second Gilded Age, supra note 27, at 980 (“The Second Gilded Age begins, more
or less, with the beginning of the digital revolution in the 1980s, but it really takes off in the early
years of the commercial Internet in the 1990s, and it continues to the present day.”).
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from all of the problems plaguing the speech environment on social media, away from all of the problems inherent in targeted-advertisingbased business models. We do not claim to know what precise mix of
regulatory strategies is best, and the answer will likely vary across markets. But for the reasons detailed above, we believe that structural reforms should assume a more prominent place in the debate. By contrast,
we doubt that the information-fiduciary idea should play any significant
role in the struggle to rein in the leading online platforms and reclaim
the online public sphere. If this Article’s main arguments have been
persuasive, the burden is on supporters of the information-fiduciary idea
to clarify how it can be reconciled with the relevant firms’ economic
incentives and with the facts of digital life, what it adds to existing theories and practices of consumer protection, and why anyone other than
the dominant platform owners should see it as a promising path forward.
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